The Engaged Thomist

A good philosophical definition of love is that love is to will the good of the other for the sake of the other.  God, classically understood, is considered to be the Good. Here is Aquinas’ proof of this in the Summa Contra Gentiles : “​​For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good. Now virtue is a perfection, since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue , as is clear in 7 Physics 3, 4. Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect. And hence every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved that God is perfect (ch. 28). Therefore, he is good.” (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C37 , https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C38 ).  God, however, also has will. Here is Aquinas’ proof of God’s having will: “For, from the fact that there is intelligence in God, it follows that there is will in him. Because, si

I recently came upon a phenomenal talk by Josh Rasmussen where he presents a novel ontological argument (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQ3ipEeIiRM&t=2628s ). I’ll just present my own variation on his argument with a few tweaks.  1. No positive property entails a negative property. 2. Absolute perfection does not entail any negative properties. 3. Absolute perfection is positive. 4. Impossible properties, necessarily, entail every property. 5. Therefore, absolute perfection is possible (since it doesn’t entail any negative properties and so it doesn’t entail every property). 6. Since absolute perfection is possibly exemplified (from 5), it is actually exemplified (since absolute perfection includes necessary existence).

The identity of indiscernibles (IoI) is a principle which is controversial in contemporary analytic philosophy, but I can’t understand why. I’m fully aware of the fact that philosophers are known for holding flatly absurd positions, and it may be the case that the reason many philosophers reject IoI. I’d like to provide reason why we ought to accept this principle, but first a formulation is in order.  Identity of Indiscernibles (IoI): if x is F where F is all the true predicates of x, and y is F, the x and y are identical. To my mind, this is obviously true, but since it is so controversial, I’ll provide some reason for accepting it. The main response to the IoI is that distinctness can be a primitive, but this seems weak, to my mind, as this would violate the PSR, which has plenty of reason behind it (see here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-020-01482-3 , https://www.amazon.com/Principle-Sufficient-Reason-Reassessment-Philosophy/dp/0521184398 , https://www.youtube.c

Kit Fine has a simple, yet powerful argument for, at least, a bare-bones hylomorphism (see here: https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/accessible_fine/Fine_NonIdentity-Thing-Matter.pdf , https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/accessible_fine/Fine_Arguing-NonIdentity.pdf ). The argument goes like this: Suppose there is a poorly made copper statue. A statue can be poorly made, but copper can’t be poorly made since copper is an element. Since a statue can be poorly made, but copper can’t be poorly made since copper is an element, the poorly made copper statue is not identical to its matter. Furthermore, the aspect of the copper statue which allows one to say that the copper statue is poorly made cannot in any way be material, otherwise one would have to say that the copper is poorly made, but this is false. So, the aspect of the copper statue which enables one to say that the copper statue is poorly mad