A Proof that God is Love

A good philosophical definition of love is that love is to will the good of the other for the sake of the other. 


God, classically understood, is considered to be the Good. Here is Aquinas’ proof of this in the Summa Contra Gentiles: “​​For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good. Now virtue is a perfection, since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue, as is clear in 7 Physics 3, 4. Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect. And hence every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved that God is perfect (ch. 28). Therefore, he is good.” (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C37, https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C38). 


God, however, also has will. Here is Aquinas’ proof of God’s having will: “For, from the fact that there is intelligence in God, it follows that there is will in him. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now ‘understood’ indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows, therefore, of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: For, since he is perfectly intelligent, as shown above (ch. 44, 45), he understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore, in him there is will” (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C72). This proof presupposes that God has intellect, but Aquinas has some very good arguments elsewhere in the SCG for that (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C44). 


Aquinas then goes onto to reject the Neo-Platonic notion that creation is a necessary emanation from God because of the fact that God is the Good and so the only thing that can necessitate the Divine Will is the Divine Essence:


“Now if God wills the divine goodness and being necessarily, someone might think that he wills other things necessarily also, since he wills all else by willing his own goodness, as we have already proved (ch. 75). Yet to those who look at it rightly, it is clear that he does not will other things of necessity.


For he wills other things as ordered to the end, which is his goodness (ch. 75). Now the will is not necessarily directed to the means, if the end is possible without them: for the physician, supposing him to have the will to heal, has no need to prescribe to the patient those remedies without which he can heal the patient. Since, then, God’s goodness can be without other things, (nay more, since nothing accrues to it from other things), he is under no necessity to will other things through willing his own goodness.


Again. Since the good understood is the proper object of the will, any concept of the intellect, provided it retains an aspect of goodness, can be an object of the will. Therefore, although the being of a thing as such is good, and its non-being an evil, the non-being of a thing can be an object of the will by reason of some connected good which is retained, although not of necessity, because it is good for a thing to be, even though another be nonexistent. Hence the will, according to its nature, is unable to will not to be only that good without the existence of which the aspect of good is wholly done away. Now such a good is God alone. Therefore, the will, according to its nature, is able to will the non-being of anything whatever except God. Now will is in God according to its full capacity, since all things in him are in every way perfect (ch. 28). Hence God can will the non-being of anything whatever except himself. Therefore, he does not necessarily will things other than himself.” (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C81.3).


What we know from all of this is that as long as God is the Good and has will, He will necessarily will Himself and Himself alone. This, however, entails that God is a subsitent act of Love as the whole of the Divine Life is just God willing His the Good for its own sake. 


One might object that this isn’t really love since the object of God’s Love is Himself, but one must remember that in God there are virtual distinctions between God’s Will and the Divine Essence and these virtual distinctions are real, in the sense that they hook onto something in reality. Given this, since the object of the Divine Will is virtually distinct from the Object of the Divine Will, in God there is a real subsistent act of love. This also fits well with Rob Koons’ model of the Trinity (see here: https://www.metaphysics-of-entanglement.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/39516/Divine_Persons_as_Relational_Qua_Objects-_by_Koons.pdf).

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