A Quick Hylomorphic Argument Against Identity Theory

Kit Fine has a simple, yet powerful argument for, at least, a bare-bones hylomorphism (see here: https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/accessible_fine/Fine_NonIdentity-Thing-Matter.pdf, https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/accessible_fine/Fine_Arguing-NonIdentity.pdf). The argument goes like this:


  1. Suppose there is a poorly made copper statue.

  2. A statue can be poorly made, but copper can’t be poorly made since copper is an element.

  3. Since a statue can be poorly made, but copper can’t be poorly made since copper is an element, the poorly made copper statue is not identical to its matter.

  4. Furthermore, the aspect of the copper statue which allows one to say that the copper statue is poorly made cannot in any way be material, otherwise one would have to say that the copper is poorly made, but this is false.

  5. So, the aspect of the copper statue which enables one to say that the copper statue is poorly made is immaterial.


I think this is a very good argument. I also think that this general outline can be used to argue against identity theory.


  1. Suppose there is a morally bad person.

  2. A person can be morally bad, but neurons can’t be morally bad.

  3. Since a person can be morally bad, but neurons can’t be morally bad the morally bad person is not identical to his neurons.

  4. Furthermore, the aspect of the morally bad person which allows one to say that the person is morally bad cannot in any way be material, otherwise one could say that neurons are morally bad, but this is false.

  5. So, the aspect of the person that allows one to say that the person is morally bad is immaterial.


It should be noted that this, on its own, would not get one to the independence of the human form from its matter, but it will still show that identity theory is false.

Comments

  1. The Engaged ThomistFebruary 14, 2022 at 7:59 PM

    Thanks :)

    ReplyDelete
  2. KorewaMarch 14, 2022 at 8:05 PM

    P2 is question begging. The only difference between "moral badness" and badness in general is that one is attributed to persons and one isn't. There's no reason to suggest that P2 is true apart from them already not being the same thing. Another problem with this is that the Identity Theory isn't a theory of personal-identity, and doesn't commit you to saying that people don't have immaterial aspects. (See Armstrong for an example) You could hold that every mental-state is a brain-state without saying that people are brains and can also say that there's an immaterial formal cause of the person—you just can't say that that's their consciousness.

    ReplyDelete

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