The Engaged Thomist

The most popular, and powerful, argument for atheism is the problem of evil. While I do not find it convincing, I certainly understand why so many people find it to be a persuasive argument for atheism. Recently, I heard a variation of the problem of evil from Ben Watkins of Real Atheology that is worthy of response. It’s called the argument from imperfection. I’m paraphrasing his argument so this may not be what he exactly said, but the general argument goes like this: God, if He exists, is a perfect being and is the Cause of all things apart from Himself. A perfect being cannot cause imperfection. There are imperfect beings. Therefore, God does not exist (from 1, 2, and 3). All of the premises in this argument are true, but the argument, as it stands, is invalid and requires another premise to make it valid: God, if He exists, is a perfect being and is the Cause of all things apart from Himself. A perfect being cannot cause imperfection. There are imperfect beings. God is the Cause

When people begin to learn more about Classical Theism and its central commitments, one of the doctrines that people find most striking is the No Real Relations Doctrine. This doctrine states that God is in no way really related to His effects, and it’s the basis for other doctrines like Divine Impassibility, that God can in no way be affected by Creation, and Divine Immutability, that God can in no way change. This doctrine seems so strange because it may not seem to make sense to say that a cause is in no way really related to its effects, but it may even cause spiritual trouble in those who mistake this doctrine to entail that God does not care about them, or love them in any way. These, however, are worries that rely on misunderstandings and when the proper points are clarified, these worries vanish. It is first important to define what it means for two things to be really related: x and y are really related if and only if x acquires some new actuality by being in relation to y. In

A few months ago, I encountered a Scotist who, for the first time, exposed me to a lot of the thought of Duns Scotus. I had known about Scotus prior to my interactions with this person, but I was not aware of the depth and richness of Scotus’ thought until this interaction. One of the most common topics of discussion between him and I was the formal distinction and whether there could be a virtual distinction. After several months of discussion and thought, I felt that there as simply no way to ground the virtual distinction and that the formal distinction must be a legitimate metaphysical tool, but I did not want this to be the case because the formal distinction necessitates a much more complex and inelegant metaphysics than we desire in our theory. I think, though, I have finally found a way to ground the virtual distinction, and avoid the unwelcome consequences of accepting the formal distinction. First, let’s get clear on what a virtual distinction and formal distinction are. A vi

Welcome to The Aspiring Jesuit! This is a philosophy blog where I share some of the philosophical topics and ideas that I find interesting and, hopefully you will too.  The reason this blog is called “The Aspiring Jesuit,” is because I have been in discernment with the Jesuits, the Society of Jesus, for about a year and a half, and I plan on entering the Society after college. The Society of Jesus also has a rich intellectual tradition and I hope to partake in and share that tradition, whether or not I enter the Society.  A little bit about me: I’m a freshman at Middlebury College in Vermont and I plan to major in philosophy. I also hope to study some foreign languages while I’m here, as Middlebury has some of the best language programs in the United States. My primary philosophical interests are the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and medieval philosophy so most of my posts will be oriented around these topics. I don’t have many philosophical commitments at this point, but I woul