A Way to Ground the Virtual Distinction

A few months ago, I encountered a Scotist who, for the first time, exposed me to a lot of the thought of Duns Scotus. I had known about Scotus prior to my interactions with this person, but I was not aware of the depth and richness of Scotus’ thought until this interaction. One of the most common topics of discussion between him and I was the formal distinction and whether there could be a virtual distinction. After several months of discussion and thought, I felt that there as simply no way to ground the virtual distinction and that the formal distinction must be a legitimate metaphysical tool, but I did not want this to be the case because the formal distinction necessitates a much more complex and inelegant metaphysics than we desire in our theory. I think, though, I have finally found a way to ground the virtual distinction, and avoid the unwelcome consequences of accepting the formal distinction.

First, let’s get clear on what a virtual distinction and formal distinction are. A virtual distinction, which was affirmed by St. Thomas Aquinas, is a distinction in a thing that is posterior to the action of the mind, but also has a basis in the thing. A formal distinction, which was affirmed by Duns Scotus, is a distinction in a thing that is prior to the action of the mind and has a basis in the thing. It is important to note that the formal distinction is a real distinction, meaning that is a distinction between things that are distinct in act, but not a distinction of composition as formalities, for Scotus, are inseparable and Scotus thought that separability was the mark of a distinction of composition.

One of the primary motivations for the formal distinction is that it can be hard to see, at first glance, how there could be a distinction in a thing that is posterior to the action of the mind, and yet has a basis in the thing. To think of an example, the human essence can be said to be rational-animality. For St. Thomas, rationality and animality are virtually distinct in the human essence, which entails that in actuality they are identical in the human essence; it’s hard to see, though, how rationality could have a basis in the human essence, yet only be distinct posterior to the action of the mind. It seems prima facie plausible to suppose that in order for a distinction in the thing to have a basis in thing, the two objects of thought that are distinct in thing, must be distinct prior to the action of mind, otherwise, how could the mind hook onto these two distinct things? For Scotus, rationality and animality are formally distinct, so they are formalities within the human essence that are distinct in act, but contained within the human essence and so are inseparable. In this case, rationality and animality are distinct prior to the action of the mind, which is why the mind is able to hook onto these two distinct concepts in the human essence.

I think the way to ground St. Thomas’ virtual distinction is to focus on how his doctrine of distinctions is grounded in his more fundamental position on the One and the many. For St. Thomas, being, or existence, is a maximum. He says in several places that being is “the act of all acts,” and contains within itself “all actuality.” Going further, for St. Thomas essence is nothing more than the limits on existence and these limits on existence, which in itself is conceptually indefinite, confines and defines existence, which is what grounds a thing’s definite definitional content. Relating this to the virtual distinction, the way which St. Thomas grounds the virtual distinction is by saying that concepts which are virtually distinct in things are simply ways in which a certain limited act of existence could be further limited. To go back to the example of the human essence, St. Thomas would say that the reason that rationality and animality are merely virtually distinct is because in actuality, a human essence merely has enough limits on its existence to make it a human essence, but that limited act of existence, which is the human essence, could be further limited to just rationality and animality. In this way, rationality and animality have a basis in the thing, the limited act of existence which is the human essence, and is posterior to the action of the mind because in actuality, the only real limits on existence are limits that give rise to a human essence.

Now, I did not argue that being is a maximum, although I will do that in subsequent posts, but I think this shows how Aquinas’s view is consistent and how it has able to avoid the formal distinction and its dismal metaphysical consequences.