The First Nominalist

The problem of universals is a long standing, perennial issue of philosophy. The problem deals with how “ultimately all connected to the issue of how universal cognition of singular things is possible” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). For example, “How do we know, for example, that the Pythagorean theorem holds universally, for all possible right triangles” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). Questions like this led Plato to develop his theory of the Forms, which are “mind-independent, real, eternal entities” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). However, “the inherent problems with Plato’s original theory were recognized already by Plato himself” as he “famously raised several difficulties, for which he apparently did not provide satisfactory answers” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). Later successors to Plato, such as Aristotle and Plotinus, contributed to the discussion of these issues and “the medieval problem of universals is a logical, and historical, continuation of the ancient problem generated by Plato’s … theory” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). The thinker who is the genesis of the medieval exploration of this problem is Boethius, but it was engaged with by all major philosophers of the period including Anslem, Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas. 

This essay will explore the medieval problem of universals, with particular attention paid to Peter Abelard’s contribution to the issue. There will be two major sections of this essay. The first will be dedicated to providing an outline of the medieval problem of universals, which will involve a discussion of the major figures in the debate, but also the key issues that were a part of the medieval debate. The second portion of the essay will be dedicated to Peter Abelard’s contribution to the medieval problem of universals. The central argument of this essay will be that Peter Abelard defended a form of nominalism, which is a very unique position among medieval philosophers.

Firstly, an outline of the medieval problem of universals is in order. The first area to explore is the one dealing with positions within the medieval debate:

Depending on which of these items (universal features of singular things, their universal concepts, or their universal names) they regarded as the primary, really existing universals, it is customary to classify medieval authors as being realists, conceptualists, or nominalists, respectively. The realists are supposed to be those who assert the existence of real universals in and/or before particular things, the conceptualists those who allow universals only, or primarily, as concepts of the mind, whereas nominalists would be those who would acknowledge only, or primarily, universal words. (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1)

These classifications (realists, conceptualists, and nominalists) are crude, but nevertheless capture the essences of the major positions of this issue during the medieval period. It is important to first not that “nearly all medieval thinkers agreed on the existence of universals before things in the form of divine ideas existing in the divine mind, but all of them denied their existence in the form of mind-independent, real, eternal entities originally posited by Plato” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). This point will aid in understanding the innovativeness of Abelard’s nominalism later in the essay. Some major medieval figures who would be classified as realists would be Boethius and Duns Scotus. Thomas Aquinas is a complicated thinker who does not clearly fit into one category, but scholars view him as holding to some form of realism or Divine conceptualism (Pasnau, “Thomas Aquinas”, 1). William of Ockham is considered to be a staunch nominalist figure, as is Peter Abelard (Spade & Panaccio, “William of Ockham,” 1). 

There were many important issues at play within the medieval problem of universals, but there are three which are important to explain. First, where do universals exist, if they exist at all? Second, if universals exist in God, how do they do so and how is this compatible with Divine Simplicity? And Third, what is the relationship between a universal and a particular that instantiates it?

  As mentioned above, nearly all medieval philosophers and theologians held to some form of realism. The few exceptions to this rule would include people like Peter Abelard and William of Ockham. Moreover, all of the thinkers of the time believed that if universals exist, they exist within the Divine essence in some way, not as eternal, independent Forms as Plato posited.

With regard to the second primary question, there was more lively debate and a greater variety of positions than the first question allowed. Within this question, there were two main positions: illuminationism and abstractionism. These positions were also related to the subject of how one comes to know universals, but had implications for the metaphysics of universals as well. Illuminationism was “Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination … the doctrine — according to which the human soul, especially ‘one that is holy and pure’, obtains a specific supernatural aid in its acts of understanding, by gaining a direct insight into the Divine Ideas themselves” applied to the problem of universals (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). It stated that man can only fully apprehend Divine Ideas, which are universals, with assistance from God via supernatural grace. The implications of this are that universals do not fully exist in the natural world since they cannot be fully grasped by the mind naturally. This leads to the view closer to Plato’s conception of the Forms existing perfectly in a third realm, but not fully in the material world. It potentially conflicts with Divine Simplicity because how real and how distinct these Divine Ideas are from God and from each other could lead to there being real distinctions within God, which is incompatible with Divine Simplicity as it is the doctrine which maintains that “that God transcends every form of complexity and composition familiar to the discursive intellect” (Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity”, 1). “One consequence” of this “is that the simple God lacks parts” (Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity”, 1).

On the other hand is abstractionism, which contends that “that we need not necessarily gain our” ideas of universals “from a supernatural source, for it is possible for us to obtain it from experience by means of the active intellect” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). This theory is much more in line with an Aristotleian understanding of reality as the view says that universals, in some way, exist in the particular object from which knowledge of the universal is gained. Moreover, the fact that the view says that knowledge of universals can be obtained through interaction with the visible world without supernatural aid, supports the understanding that this Aristotelian conception of universals holds that universals exist in particular subjects. It is this Aristotelian conception of universals, as it comes through Boethius, which Abelard rejects and argues against. Furthermore, this view easily squares with Divine Simplicity as universals which exist in God only exist conceptually, or virtually as Aquinas would put it, just as they do in objects (Pasnau, “Thomas Aquinas”, 1).

Finally, the question of how a universal, as it exists in its universal state, relates to a particular instantiation of that universal in an individual was a complex question, which relates to the previous one. The question comes down to how real, or actual or distinct, universals in the mind of God are, at least within the medieval context. On the Augustinian side, which is the illuminationist side,  the Divine Ideas are very much distinct from one another and some would interpret them as having a causal role in the generation of conceptual content in things. Contrarily, those following an abstractionist approach view the Divine Ideas are virtually present within the Divine Mind and so do not have a causal role in implanting these ideas in particulars (Feser, “The Divine Mind”, 1).

With this background in place, Peter Abelard’s nominalism and its uniqueness within medieval philosophy will be explored and demonstrated. The first evidential chip in favor of a nominalist reading of Peter Abelard is the fact that he begins by refuting two realist theories of universals coming from Boethius. The first theory states that a “‘universal thing’ in such a way that they set up essentially the same substance in things diverse from one another through forms” (Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, 29). One of his refutations of this view is that “if essentially the same thing exists in several singulars, then even though diverse forms occupy it, this substance brought about by these forms must be [identical with] that one occupied by those forms” (Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, 30). The other theory he engages is the view that “single things not only are diverse from one another by their advening forms, but are discrete ‘personally’ in their essence, and what is in one thing is in no way in any other, whether it is matter or form in the thing”, with a subsequent refutation of this view (Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, 33-34). Once he has completed the task of disarming the realist theories available to him, he declares that “now that we have shown the reasons why things taken neither singly nor collectively can be called ‘universals insofar as they are predicated of several, it remains to ascribe this kind of universality only to words” (Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, 37). This is a clear statement of nominalism as it fits well with Kilma’s definition of nominalism from before: “nominalists would be those who would acknowledge only, or primarily, universal words” (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). This is where Peter Abelard’s influence on the medieval debate can be clearly seen as he is the first medieval figure to argue against realism and defend a form of nominalism. His position and defense of nominalism add great richness to the medieval debate as it adds a new dimension by not allowing medieval authors to take realism, or conceptualism, for granted.

In conclusion, the medieval problem of universals is, in many ways, an expansion upon the ancient problem of universals, which can be found in thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. The medieval problem of universals arose from a growing engagement with Aristotelian philosophy and an attempt to grapple with the metaphysical consequences of adopting his views. The central issues at play in the debate include how do universals exist in God, how do they square with the reality of Divine simplicity, and what is the relation between universals and their instantiation, among other philosophical queries. The medieval period bore many thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, who held to a form of realism about universals, with there being very few nominalists, the most famous of which is likely William of Ockham. However, the original nominalist of the medieval period is Peter Abelard, who proposed an interesting formulation of nominalism in response to Boethius. This position was supported by citations from Abelard himself and through exegeting his text in Paul Spade’s Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham. The positions of nominalism and realism persist into the present age of philosophy and understanding Peter Abelard’s early contribution to nominalism and help to further the current discussion about the problem of universals.

Works Cited

Feser, Edward. “The Divine Intellect.” Edward Feser’s Blog, 12 Sept. 2012, edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-divine-intellect.html.

Klima, Gyula. “The Medieval Problem of Universals.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 27 Feb. 2022, plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/.

Pasnau, Robert. “Thomas Aquinas.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 7 Dec. 2022, plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/.

Spade, Paul Vincent, and Claude Panaccio. “William of Ockham.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 5 Mar. 2019, plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/.

Spade, Paul Vincent, editor. Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham. Hackett Publishing Co, Inc, 1994.

Vallicella, William F. “Divine Simplicity.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 20 Oct. 2023, plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/.