The Demands of Justice are the Demands of Charity

Whether there is a distinction between “duty” and “charity” is a question which is deeply relevant to global justice, but also morality more generally. Australian philosopher Peter Singer maintains that there is no distinction between them and, thus, says that we have an extraordinary number of moral obligations and he uses this to justify his altruistic demands of wealthy individuals and nations. I agree with his view that there is no distinction between “duty” and “charity,” but I will argue that his basis for this view is faulty since he grounds his view in his utilitarianism. I will then offer an alternative grounding for this view from a virtue ethics and natural law perspective. I will then present an objection to this view that it does not allow for the existence of supererogatory acts, but then counter this objection by explicating the relationship between charity and human nature. Ultimately, I will be arguing that the demands of justice are the demands of charity and that the best framework for this reality is virtue ethics-natural law paradigm.

In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer argues “that our traditional moral categories are upset,” but in so doing concludes that “the traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn” (Singer 235). He begins by referencing the Bangladesh genocide and the unspeakable sufferings that occurred then and also about poultry the aid from wealthy nations had been in helping refugees escape Bangladesh. He uses this example to highlight the moral absurdity that is implied from the Western countries lack of aid which could so easily be provided: “The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as highly as it values the lives of the nine million refugees” (Singer 230). He then moves from this example to his primary argument, which is primarily concerned with ethics in general rather than the specific case he mentions. Singer uses two intuitive assumptions in his argument, the first one being that “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” and his second one being that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 231). He then deals with the objections that his assumptions do not take into account “proximity or distance,” or the objection that “the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position” (Singer 231-232). He refutes the first objection by asking the rhetorical question “should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?” and answering: “one has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation” (Singer 233). Responding to the second objection, he boldly declares that “it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away” (Singer 232). Thus, he concludes that “the traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn” because the ordinary sense of these terms would say that lending aid to the people would be an act of charity, not one of duty (Singer 235). 

I find this view, that there is no distinction between “duty” and “charity,” to be true, but I disagree with the underlying principles Singer utilizes to deduce his conclusion. Singer is a utilitarian and uses this to derive his conclusion. While his conclusion seems to be true, his utilitarianism does not provide a sound basis for grounding since his utilitarianism has some unintuitive, if not clearly false, consequences. In an interview with Daniel Gross, Singer expresses some controversial views that also derive from his utilitarian beliefs, just as his view in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” flows from these beliefs: “My view then was that parents of children born with serious disabilities ought to have the option of ending the life of their child,

immediately after birth or as soon as the diagnosis has been properly established. … I don’t draw a big distinction between abortion and infanticide” (Gross 9). These contentious views are rooted in a utilitarian calculus, which says that what is morally right is what will bring about the greatest amount of happiness, usually thought of in terms of pleasure, for the greatest number of people (Sinnott-Armstrong). This calculus leads Singer to the conclusion that there is no distinction between “duty” and “charity” since it, in his view, will lead to the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, but also leads him to allow for abortion and infanticide since these might generate the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Therefore, we should reject Singer’s utilitarianism and try to find a sturdier foundation for the unification of “duty” and “charity” which will not have such unintuitive consequences.

I think this sturdier foundation is found in a virtue ethics-natural law framework. This framework starts with an examination of human nature and identifying the ends of human nature, ends which include the physical, mental, and spiritual aspects of human nature. It is important to identify these ends since these theorists ground moral obligations in what leads to human flourishing. Put more simply, what is morally right is what will lead to human flourishing and in order to determine what leads to human flourishing, we must identify the ends of human nature so that we can know what will fulfill human nature. The perfection or completion of these ends is virtue and they are what lead to human flourishing. Virtues do not merely bring happiness towards oneself, however, but they also enable one to live properly in a community as communal living is an essential part of being human. With this understanding in place, it is clear why the demands of justice would be the demands of charity on this view: moral obligations are grounded in what leads to human flourishing, but human flourishing both enables and obliges one to live properly with and for others.  Love is to will the good of the other for the sake of the other and this undergirds the virtues, since it enables one to live properly with others, and flows from them, as it is what all the virtues derive from. Given this, the demands of morality are the demands of charity. Now, the reason this applies to issues of justice is because proximity and number do not affect the obligations we have to one another since we are part of the same human community with them. So just as moral obligation demands us to live properly with people in our local community, so it also demands that we live properly with the global community. The only way to escape this conclusion would be to say that living properly in this global community is not connected towards the development of virtue, but this is absurd as virtue is found in human nature and is, therefore, universally applicable to all human beings, thereby necessitating that there be virtuous relationships to all humans, not just people who are proximate to us. Furthermore, this framework provides a much more solid foundation for the identity between “duty” and “charity” since it is not based in a calculation of (material) happiness, which may lead to the disregard of some human beings as shown by Singer, but rather in what leads to human flourishing. Singer may allow for infanticide in some cases, but this would be impossible under this virtue ethics-natural law approach since infanticide is not a charitable act; quite the opposite. So, given that  this virtue ethics-natural law framework has the same admirable conclusion as Singer’s view without its unintuitive baggage, we should opt for this framework rather than Singer’s.

One might object that this view has the unintuitive consequence of supererogatory acts being impossible. After all, Singer openly admits that these acts do not exist precisely because the demands of the moral law are so high since they are the demands of love. This, although it has a different foundation, holds to this identity as well, so it must be the case that it renders supererogatory acts impossible.

This objection, however, fails as it does not fully comprehend the relationship between charity and human nature under this virtue ethics-natural law perspective. Under a virtue ethics-natural law praxis, it is true that the demands of morality and justice are the demands of charity, but this does not entail that there are no acts that go beyond charity or that there are not acts of super-charity. For example, if someone has given a certain amount of money to charity after they have paid for their own living expenses, this is fulfilling their obligation to give. However, if this person gives so much to charity that they cannot provide for themselves, they have committed an act of super-charity. The reason for this is that while the demands of morality are the demands of charity, this charity is ordered towards human flourishing and so if one loves to the point where their lower-level needs are not being fulfilled, they are going beyond what is morally required of them. Singer’s view, on the other hand, is affected by this objection since he grounds the identity of “duty” and “charity” in a utilitarian calculus which might demand the suffering of someone or oneself, as is clear from his tolerant views on infanticide, if it will result in the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. However, the virtue ethics-natural law is not subject to this critique because it grounds its moral obligations in human nature, not a happiness calculation.

In conclusion, I began this essay by explaining Peter Singer’s view on the relationship between “duty” and “charity” in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” where he argues that the relationship between these is one of identity. I have then accepted the thesis of his paper, whilst explaining why I think we should ground this truth in a virtue ethics-natural law perspective rather than Singer’s utilitarian perspective since his perspective has unintuitive consequences that the virtue ethics-natural law perspective does not. I then explicated the objection that my view does not allow for the existence of supererogatory acts, but then explained how this objection only affects Singer and not me because of my virtue ethics-natural law paradigm. Fundamentally, I have argued that the demands of justice are the demands of charity and that this truth is best grounded in a virtue ethics-natural law framework.

Works Cited

Gross, Daniel A. “Peter Singer Is Committed to Controversial Ideas.” The New Yorker, 25 Apr. 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/the-new-yorker-interview/peter-singer-is-committed-to-controversial-ideas. 

Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, No. 1, No. 3, 1972, pp. 229–243. 

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Consequentialism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 3 June 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.