An Exercise in Boethian Logic

Logic is the most important tool that philosophers use in their endeavors as no matter the specialty, whether it be metaphysics or epistemology or aesthetics, logic is required in some way. As Boethius himself points out, “logic is” the “‘mistress’ of discourse” and philosophical exploration (Boethius 25). Furthermore, Boethius is a particularly important figure in medieval philosophy because he serves as a bridge between classical philosophy ending in antiquity and later medieval philosophy which would come after him as confirmed by Marenbon: Boethius was “one of the most important intermediaries between ancient philosophy and the Latin Middle Ages” (Marenbon “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius” 1). Moreover, Lewry reports that there are “precious” witnesses “to the resources of eighth-century logic” which “show how attenuated the presence of Boethius had become” at the time (Lewry O. P. 90). Certainly, Boethius was incredibly influential during this time, but his critical role of ‘connector’ is very palpable when one examines his work on logic. “Boethius wrote several logical textbooks” of which “five survive” (Marenbon Boethius 43). These books serve as the principal introductions to Aristotelian logic in the Middle Ages. “Two” of these books “introduce Aristotlian syllogistic” while another one introduces “‘hypothetical syllogisms’” (Marenbon Boethius 43).  Within these logical textbooks are found not only an exposition on the minutiae of logic, but also on the nature and purpose of arguments. This is one of the most important parts of Boethius’s work on logic and also the most interesting when compared with contemporary analytic philosophy. 

This essay will begin by outlining the progression of Boethius’s thought about argument in his In Ciceronis Topica. Then, it will explore two main aspects of Boethius’s view of arguments. Firstly, it will discuss the role that questions play in his notion of arguments. Then, it will discuss the level of certainty Boethius thinks an argument can produce for the belief it is intended to support given how he defines the function of an argument. Ultimately, this essay will argue that Boethius’s definition of argument is something closer to the contemporary term ‘demonstration’ rather than how the word ‘argument’ is used by contemporary analytic philosophers.

To begin, an overview of how Boethius’s views logic is in order. He begins by explaining that “there is a threefold partition of logic” and these aspects of logic are “definition, partition, or deduction” (Boethius 25). This view of logic is placed immediately after he traces the history of logic from Aristotle, through the stoics like Cicero, up to his current day. Moreover, this threefold structure to logic is revealed after he says that “logic … is expertise in discourse” (Boethius 25). Moving onto definitions of these categories, he begins by saying that “deduction” includes “ true and necessary argumentations … readily believable (that is, verisimilar) argumentations” and “sophistical (that is, tricking) argumentations” (Boethius 26). He says this as one way to divide logic, but he goes on to report that “a different division of logic is that in accordance with which the whole careful system of discourse is separated into two parts, one of discovery and the other of judgment” (Boethius 26). This is a division of logic which Boethius also likes to use as he says that “the very definition of logic seems also to make this manifest … because logic is a system of discourse, it cannot be separated from discovery; for since no one can engage in discourse without discovery” (Boethius 26). Moreover, “since logic is the careful system of discourse, judgment cannot be absent from it; for the carefulness of the system of discourse is judgment, and … if the carefulness of the system is applied to the thread of the discourse, then judgment is undoubtedly suited to a variety of discoveries” (Boethius 26). He then interweaves the threefold and twofold divisions of logic in order to illuminate both of them:

.Discovery is the basis for all the others, holding the place, as it were, of their matter in the following way. For without discovery, there cannot be definition or partition … Moreover, without discovery there cannot be deduction,  and so there will not be the necessary, the verisimilar, or the sophistical, for these three are added to discovery so that an argument becomes necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. Necessity, ready believability, and sophistry are forms of a sort; when they come to discoveries, they make arguments necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. The same point applies to partitions and definitions, for the undifferentiated power of discovery can be called definitive or divisive when it is used to define or to partition things. In this way, composed of the discovery as matter and of the superimposed differentiae as forms, they become in turn matter for judgment. For the previous division of logic into three parts sets forth the parts in such a way that discovery is the matter for each of them, but the whole division itself furnishes the matter for judgment … In this way, these first parts of logic are conjoined to the members of the second division: they have discovery as their matter but are themselves the matter for judgment. (Boethius 26)

The last crucial element of logic for Boethius is judgment and he provides a long explication of what it is and what it relates to, but the essentials of his view are found here:

The part of deduction which deals with readily believable things is based on discovery as its matter because it finds verisimilar arguments; judgment considers arguments of this sort, for there is a judgment that consists in discerning that what is discovered is not necessary but has verisimilitude. The part of deduction suited to necessary argumentations is based on the discovery of what is necessary as its matter; the judgment of it consists in the fact that because the things discovered are necessary, judgment considers them to be necessary. (Boethius 27)

With that in place, the role of questions in Boethius’s notion of argument will be examined. Boethius provides his view on questions most clearly in this section:

Now, where something is in doubt, there must be a question. Hence, if there cannot be an argument apart from something that was in doubt, there cannot be an argument apart from a question either. A question is a proposition that is in doubt. (Boethius 29)

So, for Boethius, a question expresses some proposition, whether it be a positive or negative one, which is disputed. This disputed nature of questions is a rather ordinary way of looking at the nature of questions, but the implications of it are important for his notion of argument. For him, since all questions are propositions in doubt, and arguments produce belief in a proposition that was in doubt, questions are a precondition for there being arguments. More interestingly, given that questions are propositions including things which are in doubt, arguments, for Boethius, clear away doubt in some, which explains the quote in the title of this essay: “an argument is a reason that produces belief regarding something that was in doubt” (Boethius 29).

Given this, the level of certainty that is produced from arguments, according to Boethius, is the kind of certainty produced by a demonstration and so is much greater than how powerful contemporary analytics would ascribe to arguments, at least most of them. As stated several times, Boethius thinks that “an argument is a reason that produces belief regarding something that was in doubt” (Boethius 29). The implication here is that arguments are more than mere evidential chips in favor of a position, but, rather, are powerful on their own to produce belief in a certain proposition. This is a very powerful claim as it entails that arguments, for Boethius, are closer to demonstrations of a position than anything else. To be more specific, Boethius’s language implies that he thinks arguments can infallibly lead to truth. This view of arguments is something that is common during the Middle Ages as figures like Aquinas are keen on the fact that one can demonstrate or prove certain propositions, such as the existence of God: “The existence of God can be proved in five ways” (ST I, II, III). However, such a view would be considered strange in contemporary analytic philosophy. Firstly, there are very few people who hold that one can know things infallibly, which is likely from the influence of Descartes and other skeptics in early modern philosophy. This applies to beliefs in general, such as first principles, and not only to arguments. So, it can hardly be expected that contemporary philosophers would accept that arguments can be infallible if self-evident beliefs like the cogito cannot be held with such certainty. Moreover, an increasing number of philosophers view the purpose of arguments in a vastly different light, maintaining that arguments are always derivative of a theoretical framework and so can only be considered after one has examined the internal consistency of a philosophical view. This view is held by Graham Oppy as he believes that most philosophical discussions should be conducted at the level of theories and philosophers should spend most of their time comparing theories rather than discussing arguments because arguments are derivative of theories (Bertuzzi 18:32). This contrasts with an implicitly high view of arguments that Boethius has given that he thinks they can produce a belief in a proposition by still. More precisely, since Boethius holds that arguments produce belief in a proposition that was once in doubt, there is an implicit assumption that arguments transcend theoretical bounds, as it were. Now, this reading of Boethius might simply be a consequence of the fact that he lived in a much more ideologically homogeneous society than exists today, but this stipulation does not change the fact that his view, itself, would have such a consequence. Thus, it is clear that Boethius held a much stronger and more robust view of arguments than contemporary philosophers would.

In conclusion, Boethius’s belief that arguments have the power to produce a “belief” in “something that was in doubt” reveals that he ascribed more power to arguments than contemporary analytic philosophers would “an argument is a reason that produces belief regarding something that was in doubt” (Boethius 29). This essay explored this fact by first tracing how Boethius provides a background exposition of the discipline of logic in his In Ciceronis Topica so that he can frame his notion of argument within the broader context of logic itself. The essay then explored how Boethius’s definition of question is crucial for fully understanding his view of arguments. This then dovetailed into an analysis of how much certainty Boethius thinks arguments produce for a belief. Within this analysis, there was a comparison drawn between his notion of an argument’s power and how contemporary analytics view arguments power. The conclusion of this analysis was that Boethius thought that arguments had much more than analytic philosophers today would say they do. An interesting area to further research would be to see which view of the power of arguments is correct and also to see if an older, more medieval view of the power of arguments should alter modern skeptical epistemology. These, and other areas, would be fruitful areas of research and Boethius’s thought, as shown through this essay, is a worthy place to begin these ventures.

Works Cited

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920, https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3.

Bertuzzi, Cameron. “Is the Kalam Sound? Graham Oppy vs. Andrew Loke.” YouTube, YouTube, 7 Dec. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8NrTv-Durc.

Boethius. “Book 1.” Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, translated by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1988, pp. 25–36. 

Hetherington, Stephen. “Fallibilism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019, iep.utm.edu/fallibil/.

Lewry O.P., Patrick Osmund. “Boethian Logic in the Medieval West.” Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence, pp. 90–134.

Marenbon, John. “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 21 Sep. 2021, plato.stanford.edu/entries/boethius/.

Marenbon, John. Boethius. Oxford University Press, 2003.