Anselm's Ontological Argument Works

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God in his Proslogion is one of the most important and influential arguments in the history of philosophy. There have been arguments for the existence of a First Cause dating back to the ancient world, such as the one Aristotle presents in his Physics (Physics 251a8-251b10). In the antique world, St. Augustine also presented his argument for God’s existence from Divine Ideas, but St. Anselm's argument is the first novel argument for God’s existence found in the medieval period (Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, 1). It is also often classified as the first ontological argument, although this is not clear from the argument itself and it may very well be an anachronistic way to refer to Anselm’s argument since the term ‘ontological argument’ comes from Kant centuries later (Oppy, “Ontological Arguments”, 1). Nevertheless, if Anselm’s argument is, indeed, an ontological argument then it is an unusual one as compared to later versions of the argument by figures such as Christian Wolff (Oppy, “Ontological Arguments”, 1) 

Ultimately, the novelty, innovativeness, and nature of Anselm’s argument for the existence of a perfect being is what is most interesting and worth exploring, no matter what category of argument it falls under. Anselm provides arguments as to why this perfect being is God, which will be mentioned, but it is the primary focus of this essay to discuss his argument for a perfect being. There must be an in-depth analysis and exegesis of Anselm’s argument in order to properly understand it, especially because it is often tangled up with modern ontological arguments that are of a very different nature to his argument. This analysis and exegesis will comprise most of the essay, and then there will be a discussion of how one can go about determining the soundness of the argument. In the end, the soundness of St. Anselm’s argument can be determined by understanding the scope of greatness and the terms which greatness applies to affects the meaning of greatness.

Now, an explication of Anselm’s argument in his Proslogion will be explored. Firstly, it is important to look at the relevant text in St. Anselm before exegeting it:

And indeed we believe You to be something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or is there not anything of such a nature, since the fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’? But surely this same fool when he hears this very thing that I say, ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he should not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for a thing to exist in the understanding, and another to understand a thing to exist. For when a painter thinks in advance of the things which he is about to make, he has that which he has not yet made in his understanding at least, even though he does not yet understand that it exists. Once he has painted it, he both has what he has now made in the understanding and understands that it exists. Thus, even the fool is convinced that there is in the understanding at least something than which nothing greater can be thought, because he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is in the understanding alone, it can also be thought to exist in reality, which is greater. If therefore that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, that same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is [something] than which a greater can be thought. But this cannot be the case. Therefore without doubt something than which a greater cannot be thought exists, both in the understanding and in reality. (Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, 33-34)

There is explication that Anselm himself provides of the argument in chapters 3 and 4 of the Proslogion, but this is all that is necessary to begin understanding the argument. The first thing to point out is that the argument is trying to show that denying the existence of a perfect being entails a contradiction. The structure of the argument goes something like this:

1. One can think of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived.

2. One does indeed think of such a being because in discussing the being, one is thinking about this being.

3. It is greater to exist both in reality and the mind than merely in the mind.

4. A being greater than which nothing can be conceived cannot be thought to exist in the mind alone since in doing so it can be thought to exist in reality. (Contradiction).

5. Therefore, a being greater than which nothing can be conceived must exist in reality since it exists in the mind.

There is within this argument, I believe, that when the idea of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived exists in the mind, this fact proves that the idea in the mind is caused by the actual being. Another way to phrase this would be that the precondition for thinking about a being greater than which nothing can be conceived is that such a being exists and so since we have an idea about this being, which is proven by the very fact that we are talking about the being, then that being must exist in reality. This phrasing of the structure of Anselm’s argument can make it seem more like a prefiguration of Descartes trademark ontological argument, but this is not correct (Nolan, “Descartes’ Ontological Argument”, 1). Under my reading of Anselm, it seems that the argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, in the Kantian sense, rather than an ontological argument as the reason we must accept the existence of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived is because its existence is the precondition for us thinking about that being at all (Rohlf, “Immanuel Kant”, 1). Moreover, the progression of the argument moves from the fact that we can think about a being greater than which nothing can be conceived to the existence of that thing, which further implies that it is in line with the nature of transcendental arguments since these kinds of arguments first note the conception of a thing and then move to posit the existence of the preconditions of that thing. 

Now, once Anselm has proved the existence of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived, he moves on to spend most of the Proslogion explaining why the being he proves must be the God of Catholicism. I will not spend time explaining each of these arguments since each one of these arguments require and deserve their own paper, but I would just like to note that this is what Anselm spends the rest of the Proslogion doing once he has finished with this stage of his argument for God.

With that backdrop in place, the question of how one can determine the soundness of his argument will be explored as it is closely related to understanding the structure of Anselm’s argument. In Ganuilo’s response to the Proslogion, he attempts to present a counter argument to Anselm’s argument and here is my best presentation of Gaunilo’s thought:

1. I have an idea of an island greater than which nothing can be conceived.

2. It is greater to exist both in reality and the mind than merely in the mind.

3. If this island of which I think does not exist in reality but only in then, then we can conceive of a greater island which exists both in the mind and in reality.

4. It is not possible that the greatest possible island does not exist because, by definition, it must exist both in the world and in the mind.

5. Thus, an island greater than which nothing can be conceived exists both in the mind and in reality. (Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, 64)

This is a kind of parody argument whereby Gaunilo tries to show the fallaciousness of Anselm’s reasoning through applying his reasoning to another example which leads to an absurd conclusion. The absurd conclusion in this case is that there must be an island greater than which no island can be conceived. What this response brings out is that the notion of ‘greatness’ is essential to determining the soundness of Anselm’s argument. The greatness of the being that Anselm is trying to prove is crucial to the success of his argument. Moreover, what he ascribes the greatness to in his argument is also of critical importance. It is clear from the Proslogion that the being Anselm is attempting to prove exists is the greatest being in some sense. Now, the fact that he ascribes the phrase ‘greater than which nothing can be conceived’ to the term ‘thing’ makes the argument operate in the most general terms possible, and I think this is where Gaunilo’s objection fails. Gaunilo’s counterexample of an island greater than which nothing can be conceived is not the kind of thing which can be the greatest possible thing because it is too specific. An island has many definite and finite features which are essential, such as being surrounded by water, to it so it cannot be the term used to designate that which nothing greater can be conceived. However, St. Anselm uses the term ‘thing’ in his argument which is the most general term and so can apply to things without finite features, like God. Thus, the soundness of Anselm’s argument is determined by looking at which terms greatness is applied to and understanding how these terms affect the meaning and scope of greatness.

In conclusion, Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion attempts to demonstrate the existence of God from the concept of “a being greater than which nothing can be thought” (Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, 33). He begins by showing that such a being must exist both in the world and in the mind and then goes on to describe how this being must have the Divine attributes. In his response to Ganulo, it becomes clear that the way to determine the soundness of his argument comes down to an understanding of the scope of greatness. When this understanding is properly apprehended, I believe that the argument is sound because possible counterexamples to Anselm’s line of reasoning, as seen in the Ganulo’s perfect Island, deal with things that are greater than all things that exist. However, there is no contradiction in denying the existence of an island greater than which nothing can be conceived because there could be something which does exceed it in greatness. Contrarily, the being Anselm tries to prove is “a being greater than which nothing can be thought”, thus rendering this being greater than all things in every aspect, not just specific ones (Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, 33). Thus, such a being would exist in reality and the mind since it is greater to exist in reality and the mind than just in the mind. Moreover, the being that this argument proves must have the Divine attributes because it is a perfect being because it is the greatest possible being. So, Anselm’s argument provides a clear and powerful demonstration of God’s existence and should be recognized as such.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Translated by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1995. https://sites.unimi.it/zucchi/NuoviFile/Barnes%20%20-%20Physics.pdf

Klima, Gyula. “The Medieval Problem of Universals.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 27 Feb. 2022, plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/.

Logan, Ian, and Anselm. Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of Anselm’s Argument and Its Significance Today. Ashgate, 2009.

Nolan, Lawrence. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 14 Feb. 2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/.

Oppy, Graham. “Ontological Arguments.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 6         Feb. 2019, plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/.

Rohlf, Michael. “Immanuel Kant.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 28 July

     2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/.