Some Thoughts on Harman’s View of Qualia

In “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Gilbert Harman argues that qualia can be explained in functionalist terms. There is a particularly important passage: "Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational features of the tree 'from here'" (39). What Harman is trying to elucidate in this quote is that our qualia are nothing over and above the data that we encounter. In other words, the qualities of experience we possess are not properties of the experience itself, but rather these qualities are properties of the thing experienced. So, in the tree example, the intrinsic qualities which we often associate, or even identify with, qualia which are over-and-above the thing experienced are actually just features of the tree. Now, the broader point of Harman’s paper is to show that qualia can be explained in functionalist terms. Specifically, he is trying to show that since qualia have an intentional aspect to their nature, they can be explained fully in terms of those intentional aspects. So, if Harman is right that the intrinsic qualities of experience are nothing above the features of the objects of our perception or experience, then he can reduce qualia to intentions for the objects of our experience are what our experiences are about. To go back to the tree example, the tree is the object of experience and so the intrinsic qualities of our experience are nothing more than the features of the tree that we are perceiving. Our perception, however, necessarily includes the tree so the intention of our perception, the aboutness of our perception, is the tree and since the intrinsic qualities of our experience are just features of the true, those qualities are explainable in terms of the intention to perceive the tree.

This approach is quite interesting, and I could see why people would find this approach compelling, especially if they are already attracted to functionalism, but I still have my doubts. I think that Harman’s view works best when thinking of how we experience things outside of us, like trees, but I think it has difficulty in accounting for the qualities of introspection. For example, if I think about my own consciousness the object of my intention will be my consciousness. However, included in my consciousness will be my powers of intention and if the intrinsic qualities of my experience are ultimately explainable in terms of my intentions, then it seems that my intention will have intrinsic qualities since it is the cause of my experience. This, however, seems to lead us to say that qualia are intrinsic to experience since they cause my experience, in this case my intention, and they are also the object of my experience.

One question I have for Harman is how he accounts for the intrinsic qualities that arise from introspection since it seems that his view requires him to say that these intrinsic qualities are qualia intrinsic to experience.