Some Thoughts on the Distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness

In “Availability: The cognitive basis of experience”, David Chalmers argues that a slightly modified notion of A-consciousness makes it “empirically inseparable” from P-consciousness, which Chalmers, in turn, uses to argue for irreducibility of P-consciousness (148). Chalmers begins by arguing that a better definition of A-consciousness is that “a content is A-conscious … when it is directly available for use in directing a wide range of behaviors” (148). He points out that this definition is not that different from Block’s definition and also that it has the benefit of being able to accommodate cases where contents are consciously available, instead of only allowing for cases where contents are consciously accessible. With this conceptual framework in place, Chalmers argues that, empirically, A-consciousness and P-consciousness always occur together. He gives the example of a module where “nine letters in a square array are experienced, but only three can be reported at a time” (148). Under his new definition, A-consciousness and P-consciousness occur together as all nine letters are experienced and all nine letters are consciously available. For Chalmers, this creates some issues with Block’s view. Chalmers sees the primary purpose of Block’s distinction between the different kinds of consciousness as attempting to create a framework where phenomenal experience can be explained in functional terms. Chalmers, however, thinks that his new definition of A-consciousness “makes the search for a function for P-consciousness even more hopeless” (149). Chalmers feels this way because if A-consciousness is defined in terms of availability rather than accessibility, then A-consciousness maps directly onto experience. For example, in the case where one experiences all nine letters of the square array, it does not matter if one can only report three of the letters at a time: since one experiences all nine letters, they are all consciously available to you and so would fall under A-consciousness. Given this, it is hard to see what kind of functional role P-consciousness could have since the explanatory work it is supposed to do will already be accomplished by A-consciousness. As a result, Chalmers concludes that “it” is “best to accept instead that phenomenal consciousness is distinct from any physical or functional property” (149).


I suspect that Block would resist Chalmers’ move to alter the definition of A-consciousness. There is a vagueness in the notion of “availability” since it is not quite clear what would constitute something as consciously available. Chalmers says that his definition “works to eliminate contents that can be retrieved with some work but that are not conscious” but this is not altogether clear (148). In the case where one only has conscious access to three letters of the nine-letter array, in what sense are the other six letters available to the conscious observer? It seems that they are available to the observer in virtue of the fact that he is phenomenally acquainted with the other six letters, but these other letters are not object of his intentional thought so it’s not clear what role they have in reasoning. Indeed, if one is not intentionally aware of certain concepts when reasoning, in what sense do they inform one’s rational decision within the confines of a discrete intellectual act?

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