Some Thoughts on the Distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness
In “Availability: The cognitive basis of experience”, David Chalmers argues that a slightly modified notion of A-consciousness makes it “empirically inseparable” from P-consciousness, which Chalmers, in turn, uses to argue for irreducibility of P-consciousness (148). Chalmers begins by arguing that a better definition of A-consciousness is that “a content is A-conscious … when it is directly available for use in directing a wide range of behaviors” (148). He points out that this definition is not that different from Block’s definition and also that it has the benefit of being able to accommodate cases where contents are consciously available , instead of only allowing for cases where contents are consciously accessible . With this conceptual framework in place, Chalmers argues that, empirically, A-consciousness and P-consciousness always occur together. He gives the example of a module where “nine letters in a square array are experienced, but only three can be reported at a time” (148...