A Response to Fahkri on Modal Collapse
A while ago, Omar Fahkri published a new version of the modal collapse objection to classical theism (CT) (see here: https://philarchive.org/rec/FAKALA). In the paper, he argues that while the typical modal collapse argument does not show that CT is internally incoherent, the objection illuminates an explanatory advantage that non-CTists have over CTists. This, according to Fahkri, is based on the fact that the non-CT God has parts and these parts can change across possible worlds and so provide richer explanations for different creations in different possible worlds than the CT God can since the CT God is absolutely simple.
The first thing to note is that the explanatory difference that Fahkri says gives an explanatory advantage to the non-CT is actually open to the CT because of the virtual distinction. Explanation is about making things intelligible to the intellect and so using the virtual distinction to point out intentional distinctions in God could help the CT get out of the challenge the Fahkri presents and, so, the indeterminism between God and Creation can be explained by appeal to deeper explanations in God on CT, contrary to what Fahkri says.
It is also important to note that metaphysical explanation is always ordered effect-to-cause, meaning that when we want to explain something we notice a certain fact about the world and then appeal to things prior to that fact in order to explain it. For example, if there is a fact that an electron goes through the right slit in an experiment, the explanation of that fact, namely that the electron went through the right slit, is always going to be prior to the fact itself and even though the fact is caused indeterministically, it is perfectly intelligible with that fact obtains. From this it follows that explanation is not about predicting effects from their causes, but rather by deducing a cause from an effect. This is what is required to undercut the explanatory difference principle for the difference principle assumes that if the same cause explains different effects across possible worlds, then there is some bruteness or unintelligibility in the explanation, but this is not the case when we understand that explanation is ordered effect-to-cause. To use the example from before, when the electron goes through the right slit, it is perfectly intelligible why the electron goes through the right slit; we can explain this fact by appealing to things like the experimental set-up. In a different possible world where the electron goes through the left slit, it is perfectly intelligible why it does so and we would simply appeal to the same facts as before to explain why the electron goes through the left slit. The reason that this does not result in any metaphysical bruteness is because in the possible world where the electron goes through the right slit there is no need to explain why it goes through the right slit rather than the left one because there is no truthmaker for the electron going through the left slit because it didn’t and the ordering of explanation is always effect-to-cause. With this in mind, even if we grant that Fakhri is simply demanding a non-contrastive cross-world explanation, his worry that CT offers less explanatory power then the non-CT model is avoided with this understanding that explanation is about making things intelligible and that the order of explanation is always effect-to-cause.
It is also unclear from Fakri’s explanation of the person firing a gun that the explanation changes across possible worlds. He writes: “Let us call this version the Nondeterministic Possible World Dwight case. Let us stipulate that the objective probability of Dwight pulling the trigger given that Dwight wills to pull the trigger in the context he is in is .99. Now in one world the trigger is pulled and another it isn’t. Now, in this nondeterministic case, there is still an explanation of why Dwight's Willing to pull the trigger did not bring about the intended effect: it is explained, in part, by the probability distribution. There is a .01 chance that the same identical cause does not bring about the same effect. Moreover, a deeper explanation can point to what the underlying mechanisms in the relation between the cause and effect that ground the indeterminism.” From this, it seems that the explanans remains the same across possible worlds for the probabilities seem to remain the same across possible worlds and the underlying explanation of the indeterminism also seems to remain the same.
Another route to attack Fakhri’s point is by appealing to an Aristotelian or branching theory of modality where possible worlds branch off of the actual world. If this theory is true, then Fakhri’s demand for a non-contrastive cross-world explanation becomes a demand for a contrastive explanation for if the branching theory of modality is true possible worlds are intrinsically linked to the actual world and so when asking for why does the same cause produce different effects in different possible worlds, one would be asking why does the same cause branch off into different possible worlds and this would collapse into a demand for a contrastive explanation.
Even if we were to grant all that Fakhri has argued so far, his demand for a cross-world explanation would lead to modal collapse. In the paper, Fakhri argues that the non-CT can give a richer explanation of why there are different possible creations in different possible worlds because the non-CT can say that God has some reason for creating a different creation in different possible worlds. He also defines the non-CT God as “a perfectly rational being.” The problem comes in when we realize that the non-CT God would be omniscient and so He would always know all the different possible creations that He could create and since He is a perfectly rational being then He will choose which creation to create based on the value of a given creation. If there is a best of all possible worlds, then the non-CT God will create that world because he is perfectly rational and will choose the world that has the greatest value, but if this is the case then modal collapse ensues because the reasons will remain the same across possible worlds because God is omniscient. Moreover, it’s not at all clear that God’s parts, on the non-CT view, don’t stay the same across all possible worlds because of God’s necessity. If there is not a best of all possible worlds then, the non-CT God’s choice to create some world may be, in some sense, arbitrary, which would call into question the non-CT God’s perfect rationality. The CT has the advantage here for he says that God is perfectly rational and so will always choose the highest good, which is Himself, and the different creations that He might create are the non-necessary means by which God Wills Himself. One may think that God’s choosing some creation over another in different possible worlds would be arbitrary or brute, but this is not so because God always has a reason to create, namely Himself and the fact that this reason remains the same across possible worlds does not make it brute or arbitrary because of the ordering of explanation that has been discussed earlier.
So, for all these reasons, Fahkri’s new modal collapse argument seems to fail.
So there are so many things that I want to say about this topic.
ReplyDeleteThere are two immediate point I want to make. First of all having more parts by itself doesn't yield any further explanation. If, for the sake of argument the connection between God's intention or willing and the existence of the actual world were brute, we wouldn't have made any progress in terms of explanation if God were to have parts that do explain this world rather than another, but at the same time the connection between God's necessary essence and these particular parts were brute as well. This much should be clear. An explanation that has more steps but still terminates in a brute unexplained fact doesn't fare any better than an explanation that would have fewer steps but still terminates in a brute one. Both are on par.
Unrelated to this particular topic at hand, worries about bruteness in explanations and due to its explanatory power alone these considerations have let me to take seriously the possibility that every possible world there is, is actually out there. But that's a topic for another day.
Going back to the original topic if the simple Divine Essence is capable of explaining the particular contingent Universe without that additional part that counts in favor of it. Because unlike with complex theism we haven't introduced an additional entity that changes across possible world and ends up introducing contingencies that still are in need of explanation. In that particular example I actually don't see where the complex theistic hypothesis could gain its advantage. Let's concede for sake of argument that it would actually be a superior explanation if there were an identifiable thing called God's intention that entails the particular world we live in and thus perfectly intelligibly explains it. A different intention would thereby explained a different world. And this is where I see the issue comes in. If we truly want to act like God could actually have had a different intention but he didn't for particular reasons, then it remains to be asked what would have been different in other world where God would have been impressed by other reasons, if they were present to him in this world as well. What would have to have been different? I don't want to press this question any further but merely want to hint as a possible source of contingency that would actually be left unexplained. This is the most interesting part in this current discussion, I don't actually see anything new coming up. The more I read from older sources for example from Barry Miller where he of course references his contemporary philosophers, who raised pretty much the exact same issues, the more I get the feeling that we are stuck in a kind of limbo where questions that have already been answered are just raced over and over again, because both parties it seems that in contemporary discussions around Divine Simplicity this suggestion is acknowledged but never worked out by its critics forgot the answer. An example of that could be found in the discussion of omniscience by Patrick Grim who, although he is definitely not a theist, has made a valuable contributions to that topic in having already suggested 30 years ago that God's knowledge of truth can't be propositional.
DeleteI mentioned this example because I have the feeling that Barry Miller has done the same thing when it comes to divine intention, since he, among many since him, has suggested in his book "A most unlikely God" that God wills but choice is foreign to him. It seems that in contemporary discussions about divine simplicity this suggestion, if it's acknowledged at all, is never actually worked out and the critics seem not to understand that they are committed to the same thing if they believe that the Universe has an absolute explanation in God.
I do agree with your non-contrastive model of contingent facts and do not mean to oppose what you write, but to add another angle of criticism against your interlucor.
DeleteOne thing that is very important to me and i know many philosophers even people like Alexander Pruss who do that, but there is just no sense to be attached to probabilities when it comes to libertarian actions. I think i understand why these philosopher's doing that, I mean a kind of presents itself as an option to showcase that we do really have different options to choose from while at the same time avoiding the charge that we are leaving free actions unexplained. To me that idea is obviously unacceptable though. I honestly don't understand why they feel compelled to put indeterministic quantum events metaphysically on par which supposedly rational actions. Seriously this is what libertarian free will was supposed to be then i don't think we need that notion at all and we can stick to current physics as an example for nondeterminism. That version of free will falls prey to the dilemma between determined or random.
So while I agree with you with the application of non-contrastive explanations to actual indeterministic physical facts, this leaves out the obvious component of rational action namely the contemplation of reasons. And I think if we are talking about that topic we can't be satisfied with the same conditions or reasons producing two different effects of the supposedly rational action. Just to make that even more obvious, suppose that your wife is about to get hit by a car, you have the ability to rescue her, you do love her, there is no reason why you shouldn't interfere, yet at the same time there is no logical impossibility in you not interfering. I assume now that Fakhri would apply a very low probability to you not interfering. Fair enough. But it should be obvious for you and me now that if we were actually in that possible world in which you wouldn't interfere and all the reasons we were just talking about are applying, then unless you adhere to a position that entails that we are not morally culpable, the mere answer of probability distribution should be unsatisfying for the actual action taking place.
I agree with the rest of the point you were making and think that your argument is successful in mirroring the recent modal collapse objections. I personally would approach modality differently and have been asking myself if creation as a whole is directed to the good, whether there would be any collapse lingering at all, if we don't assume a priori that God determines every world he creates. If, for example, individuals are unknown before them becoming actual, then the idea that God could create a particular world that he wants to, seem to become a category error, since facts and states of affairs involving individuals aren't knowable before creation itself. I think this very much fits though with the classical theistic identification of divine intention and action with the actual creation. But that's a discussion we should have on a different day.