Is Birth Morally Significant?

The academic, philosophical level of the abortion debate is often unknown or inaccessible to the general public. Despite this, many pro-choice advocates would be happy to know that the vast majority of applied ethicists and philosophers in general believe that abortion, at least in the first-trimester, is morally permissible (see here: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4974?aos=26 and https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4974). However, a fact that these same advocates would not be so thrilled about is the fact that most of these same philosophers and ethicists also think that infanticide is morally permissible for the same reasons that abortion is morally permissible (see here: https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/files/infanticide2pdf). This fact is borne out most famously by pro-choice philosopher Michael Tooley (see here: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264919). The primary basis for this conclusion is the fact that there are “no intrinsic differences between premature infants and viable fetuses” (see here: https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/files/infanticide2pdf). There have, however, been some pro-choice philosophers who have resisted this deeply unintuitive and morally abhorrent conclusion. In this post I’ll explore two proposals which attempt to show that there is a morally relevant difference between abortion, even a moment before birth, and infanticide.

The first of these arguments comes from Regina Rini. For her, there are two ways in which an entity possesses a right to life: “i. an individual capable of conceiving of herself as the subject of a life that she values” and/or “ii. an individual capable of valuing certain aims, for which the continuation of her life is instrumentally necessary” (see here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/39/5/353). Rini says that Tooley thinks that i. is the only way in which one has a right to life and, if this were true, then both abortion and infanticide would be morally permissible, but if ii. is also way in which one can have a right to life, then abortion is permissible, but infanticide is not; or at least, that is what Rini contends. It is also important to note that Rini thinks that ii. does not require that the individual possess consciousness.

I have a few things to say about this argument. First, simply using the language of ii., it would prohibit abortion from conception because the conceptus does have the capacity to value certain aims which are necessary for it to live as it moves towards certain goods, such as the endometrial wall. Of course, the conceptus is not conscious of what the endometrial wall is, but it can recognize the good of the endometrial wall as demonstrated by the fact that it moves towards it and tries to implant itself in the endometrial wall. This may seem odd to some, but notice that the language Rini uses is very teleological, especially her use of the word “aims.” Moreover, since she does not think that consciousness is not required for an entity to have a right to life via ii., the mere motion towards some good by the individual is enough to show that the entity values “certain aims” since such motion acknowledges the good towards which the motion is directed. This leads me to my second point which is that this way to a right to life would grant a right to life to literally every substance since each substance moves towards the good and so, in this way, is “capable of valuing certain aims, for which the continuation of her life is instrumentally necessary.” This seems to be a devastating entailment of this view since it is very clear, as I am sure Rini would admit, that hydrogen atoms do not have a right to life. My final point would just be that if ii. includes some form of consciousness, then it would have the same issues as Tooley’s view has and if it requires some form of sentience, then it would prohibit abortion from at least the tenth week and grant a right to life to many, many animals, which is also a conclusion Rini would like to avoid (see here: https://calumsblog.com/2022/02/10/embryology-and-the-beginning-of-life/). 

The second article we will look at comes from Lindsey Porter. In her article “Abortion, infanticide and moral context,” she argues that what makes abortion permissible, while infanticide is impermissible is the fact that they occur in different contexts. In abortion, the context is not one in which the unborn human being is anchored in relations which confer a right to life upon it, while in the case of infanticide, this act occurs within a context where there are relations which confer a right to life on the baby. To go a bit deeper, in the case of abortion, there are no relations in which people think the unborn human being is valued, but in infanticide there are such relations.

I think this attempt to distinguish between abortion and infanticide is significantly weaker than the previous one. Firstly, this account would allow for infanticide in certain cases, specifically in contexts where infants are not valued and so are not in relations where their right to life is recognized, such as when a baby survives an abortion. Moreover, it’s unclear how this account would prevent the killing of adult human beings who are not deemed valuable by people with whom they are in relation. Indeed, it seems that the actions of the Nazis against the Jews at Auschwitz, and throughout the Holocaust, could be permissible on this view since Jews, in these context, were not deemed to be valuable by the persons with whom they were in relation. Now, Porter may respond that in the case of the Nazis they had intrinsic properties which conferred on them a right to life, but then it’s unclear why abortion would be permissible depending on the intrinsic properties are. If these properties are something like consciousness or the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, then it’s, again, unclear why infanticide is impermissible on her view. Secondly, this view entails that a right to life is not an intrinsic property, at least not per se, which seems very odd to say. Indeed, it seems that fundamental moral rights, such as the right to life, are essential properties, by which I mean part of the nature or essence of the thing, which is why we refer to some rights as human rights: rights one has in virtue of being human. Moreover, if rights, even ones as fundamental as the right to life, are not intrinsic properties, then it’s, at least, unclear that adult human beings have an intrinsic right to life - again, this is a very intuitive conclusion. Thirdly, and finally, this account seems to undermine the very concept of human rights. As I just mentioned, human rights are rights one has in virtue of being human, but if a right, such as the right to life, is conferred upon an individual because of the context in which they exist and relations thereof, then it is not virtue of being human that one possesses the right to life. This seems to be a terrible consequence of this account and seems to significantly undermine its viability (no pun intended). So, for all these reasons above, Porter’s attempt to find a morally relevant difference between abortion and infanticide fails.

Given this review, it seems that both accounts fail to provide a reason to think that abortion is permissible, while infanticide is impermissible. So, it seems that Tooley’s inference, an inference which is shared by many pro-choice philosophers, from the permissibility of abortion to the permissibility of infanticide still stands.