Some Thoughts on Existence

The Fregean model of existence, which can also be referred to as the thin model of existence, holds that “the concept of being is closely allied with the concept of number: to say that there are x’s is to say that the number of x’s is 1 or more—and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting, nothing more” (Van Inwagen 4, 2006). This, however, leads to some serious metaphysical issues, as people like Vallicella have argued:

“On the thin theory, existence is a property of concepts only and cannot be sensibly predicated of individuals. The theory says that existence is the property of being instantiated, the property of having one or more instances. An affirma- tive general existential such as “Horses exist” does not predicate existence of individual horses; it predicates instantiation of the concept horse. Equivalently, it says that the number of horses is one or more. And a negative general existen- tial such as “Mermaids do not exist” does not predicate anything of individual mermaids—after all, there aren’t any—it denies that the concept mermaid has any instances. Equivalently, it says that the number of mermaids is zero.The theory handles the semantics of general existentials very nicely, and this is a point in its favour. But our main concern is with the ontology of the thin theory. It is important to distinguish between the instantiation theory as a semantic theory about existential sentences and an ontological theory about existence. Let us suppose for the moment that every general existential can be expressed salva significatione as an instantiation claim. This is false, as I will show later. But even if it were true, it would not follow that the thin theory is adequate ontologically. To see what is wrong with the ontology of the theory, note first that instantiation is a relation, a dyadic asymmetrical relation. We can of course speak of the property of being instantiated but only so long as it is understood that this is a relational property, one parasitic upon the relation of instantiation. Therefore, if a first-level concept C is instantiated, then there is some individual x such that x instantiates C. It would be nonsense to say that C is instantiated while adding that there is nothing that instantiates it. That would be like saying that Tom is married but there is no one to whom he is married. Just as “Tom is married” is elliptical for “Tom is married to someone”, “C is instantiated” is elliptical for “C is instantiated by some individual x”. Now either x exists or it does not. Suppose it does not. Then we have instan- tiation without existence. If so, existence cannot be instantiation. For example, let C be the concept winged horse and let x be Pegasus. Assuming for the moment that there are non-existent objects, the latter instantiates the former since Peg- asus is a winged horse. But Pegasus does not exist. So existence cannot be the second-level property of instantiation if we allow non-existent objects to serve as instances of concepts. The instantiation theory of existence is false if there are non-existent objects. Now suppose that x exists as we must suppose if we deny that there are non-existent objects. Then the theory is circular: It presupposes first-level exis- tence. If the concept American philosopher is instantiated, then there is at least one individual that instantiates it, an individual that possesses first-level exis- tence. No first-level concept or property or propositional function or cognate item can be instantiated unless it is instantiated by some individual that exists, where “exists” obviously cannot have the sense of “is instantiated”. Because of this circularity, the thin or quantificational theory in all its variants is unten- able. It fails as an answer to the question, What is existence?” (Novotný & Novák 52-53, 2016).

Vallicella’s argument seems quite powerful and provides good reason for rejecting the Fregean model of existence. How then, though, are we supposed to account for the existence and instantiation of concepts? The Thomistic model offers a nice solution.

The Thomistic model of existence holds that existence, esse, is the most fundamental principle of actuality in things. It also maintains that existence, esse, in itself is conceptually indefinite and it is only essence, which are ultimately the limits on esse that give rise to definite conceptual content in things. This seems to be a plausible model as in order to avoid the vicious circularity of the Fregean model, we must posit that existence is not a second-order property of things. However, existence can also not be like other first-order properties as this falls prey to Kant’s criticism that existence is not a real predicate, as it does not add any definitional content to things (Kant et. al 566, 2009). Therefore, existence must be more fundamental than all first-order properties and act as a sort of ground for all first-order properties, which means that existence must be inherently conceptual as existence cannot be the ground of something conceptual if it is not itself conceptual in some sense. Again, though, existence does not add conceptual content to a thing, as Kant points out, but it must be absolutely fundamental in the thing so it seems that there must be some other principle in the thing which limits existence’s conceptual content and this is the Thomistic conception of essence (Kant et. al 566, 2009). Thus, it seems that there is at least some reason to accept the Thomistic model of existence.

Works Cited

Kant, I., Guyer, P., & Wood, A. W. (2009). The Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press. 

Novotný Daniel D., & Novák Lukáš. (2016). Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 

Van Inwagen, P. (2006). Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge Univ. Press.