Some Thoughts on Existence
T he Fregean model of existence, which can also be referred to as the thin model of existence, holds that “the concept of being is closely allied with the concept of number: to say that there are x ’s is to say that the number of x ’s is 1 or more—and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting, nothing more” (Van Inwagen 4, 2006). This, however, leads to some serious metaphysical issues, as people like Vallicella have argued: “On the thin theory, existence is a property of concepts only and cannot be sensibly predicated of individuals. The theory says that existence is the property of being instantiated, the property of having one or more instances. An affirma- tive general existential such as “Horses exist” does not predicate existence of individual horses; it predicates instantiation of the concept horse. Equivalently, it says that the number of horses is one or more. And a negative general existen- tial such as “Mermaids do not exist” does not predicate anything of indiv