Some Thoughts on How to Ground Social and Political Obligations with Some Connections to Rawls

The liberal tradition has historically rejected that human beings have obligations to which they did not explicitly consent (Uzgalis, 2018). Despite this, the trajectory of the tradition has been away from its more libertarian members and towards thinkers like John Rawls who seem to flirt with the idea. The foundational, and incredibly famous, thought experiment for Rawls’ theory is the “Original Position” (Freeman, 2019). In this thought experiment, there are rational, self-interested persons, separated from their conditions in the world and they are supposed to create the rules of the society that they want to live in. Rawls concludes from this thought experiment that these persons will establish “two principles of justice: the first guarantees the equal basic rights and liberties” and “the second principle provides fair equality of educational and employment opportunities” (Freeman, 2019). For Rawls, these ought to be the two fundamental principles of justice in society. In this essay, I will explicate the “Original Position” thought experiment and explain how his thought experiment leaves open the possibility that obligations are never antecedent to consent. I will then argue that Rawls’ ought to explicitly accept that some obligations are antecedent to choice in order to ground his two principles of justice. I will raise the objection that such obligations would result in resentment because the obligations were not consented to. I will then respond to this by showing how such obligations will lead to their own happiness rather than resentment given that these social and political obligations will be parts of the moral law. My central thesis is that Rawls’ principles of justice are best grounded in social and political obligations which are antecedent to choice.

The “Original Position” thought experiment is the way in which Rawls grounds his two fundamental principles of justice. Rawls also sees the “Original Position” as the starting point for the creation of the social contract. This becomes clear when one sees that while Rawls thinks that human beings, whether or not they live in a society, have “natural” rights, he also thinks that these rights “do not provide an adequate basis for ascertaining the rights and duties of justice that we owe one another as members of the same ongoing political society” (Freeman, 2019). Rawls also says in “Justice as Fairness: A Restatement” that “the principles of justice” are “agreed to” (Rawls and Kelly 83). In essence, Rawls does not say that social and political obligations can be grounded in something prior to the social contract; he does not think that social and political obligations can be grounded in something prior to consent, which puts him in line with the rest of the liberal tradition. With this in mind, it is important to look at who Rawls includes in the “Original Position.” He describes the people in the “Original Position” as “rational persons” who “upon reflection can formulate a conception of their good” (Freeman, 2019). This is what Rawls means by rational, self-interested persons. Going further, Rawls conceives of the persons in the “Original Position” as “‘mutually disinterested,’ in the sense that they take no interest in one another’s interests” (Freeman, 2019). This entails that the people in the “Original Position” do not, necessarily, form the social contract out of obligations that they feel they have to each other, but, rather, leaves open the possibility that they postulate the principles of justice out of self-interest. Rawls leaves open the possibility that it is self-interest which forms the basis of the social contract, which is itself the basis of social and political obligations which people have to one another. So, Rawls does not explicitly say that there are obligations prior to choice in the “Original Position,” and leaves open the possibility that they only exist insofar as the self-interested consent of the people in the “Original Position” allow.

Rawls ought to have explicitly endorsed that some social and political obligations are antecedent to choice since it provides a solid foundation for social cohesion. Rawls recognizes that a central question of the liberal project is “the question of stability” (Rawls and Kelly 180). He understands that liberalism inherently tends towards individualism, which can be in tension with social and communal bonds. Rawls, however, is fairly sympathetic to ideas which have traditionally been outside of the liberal tradition and has engaged with ideas that would be considered more communitarian, such as his prioritizing of the family (Wenar, 2021). Given this, Rawls should have explicitly endorsed that some obligations are antecedent to choice. Positing some a priori social obligations necessarily bonds people because obligations are always towards something external to the self. After all, it makes no sense to speak of the parental obligation of a father without accounting for his daughter. Obligations, therefore, are always oriented towards others and so, necessarily, tie people to each other. A good way to ground social obligations is by linking them to the shared humanity among members of society as this commonality cannot be denied without embracing absurdity. So, this provides a sturdy foundation for the implementation of Rawls’ fundamental principles of justice. For the first principle, if we simply posit, prior to agreement, that we have an obligation to guarantee “equal basic rights and liberties” to others in virtue of the fact that we share a common nature, we will have a society that will not question our obligation to do so since one cannot reasonably deny that we share a common humanity (Freeman, 2019). Moreover, if his second principle is grounded in obligation which is itself grounded in a common humanity there will, again, be a solid foundation of our principles of justice that cannot be avoided, on pain of absurdity. It is hard to find a greater bulwark of protection for social cohesion than in obligations that are primitive in society, and so Rawls should have embraced this.

One might object that Rawls ought not to explicitly endorse that some social and political obligations are prior to choice since if obligations are prior to consent, people will resent these obligations which will threaten social cohesion. The thought is that this resentment would be produced by the fact that when things are imposed upon people without their agreement they feel that their agency is either removed from them or disregarded as significant since they did not choose to enter into what is imposed upon them. In this case, these obligations would, seemingly, be placed upon members of society without their consent, and this can cause frustration between members of society. Indeed, they did not have any control over these obligations, and so there seems to be a stripping of people's agency, which could easily result in resentment between people who have mutual obligations to one another. Moreover, this resentment could produce a weakening of social cohesion since the frustration people experience will be frustration towards others members of society because the obligations people have are directed towards other members of society. In sum, the resentment and frustration caused by there being social and political obligations antecedent to choice could lead towards a rupturing of social cohesion, rather than securing it.

This objection, however, fails as people will not resent their obligations to each other because following them will benefit individuals more than if they disobey them. Firstly, people who disobey their obligations will simply be acting immorally and people do not feel resentment towards the moral law when they breach it, they merely feel regret over their actions. Moreover, the guilt which comes from breaching the moral law never results in a resentment towards the moral law, but rather discourages them from engaging in immoral behavior in the future. Also, acting in accord with one’s social and political obligations produces a stable and healthy society which will, inevitably, benefit the individual who fulfills their obligations as doing so will contribute to the stability and health of their society. Furthermore, living in a stable society leads people towards their personal happiness, but the fact that these individuals will be contributing to the betterment of the society will give individuals a sense of purpose and attachment to their society; this is a result of their obligations being antecedent to choice. So, rather than these obligations leading to resentment because the obligations are antecedent to consent, they would lead to increased social cohesion and increased happiness in the members of the society.

John Rawls was a liberal thinker who tended in the direction that some obligations were fundamental, although he did not explicitly say that any were in his famous thought experiment: the “Original Position” (Freeman, 2019). In this paper, I have argued that he should have embraced such obligations. I explicated the “Original Position” thought experiment and explained how Rawls used this experiment to rationally ground his principles of justice. I then argued that Rawls’ should have been explicit that some obligations are antecedent to choice as they provide the best ground for his two principles of justice. I discussed the objection that if some social obligations are prior to consent then there may be resentment towards the obligations since they, seemingly, strip people of agency. I responded to this by pointing out how obligations will lead to increased happiness in members of society and I grounded this in the fact that these obligations would be aspects of the moral law. In essence, I have argued that some social and political obligations should be antecedent to consent and Rawls should have explicitly embraced this.

Works Cited

Freeman, Samuel. “Original Position.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 3 Apr. 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/.

Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. WRMS, 2003.

Uzgalis, William. “John Locke.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 1 May 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/.

Wenar, Leif. “John Rawls.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 12 Apr. 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/.