Some Thoughts on Spinoza's View on Substance

While Spinoza’s radical monism may seem implausible to many philosophers, both during his lifetime and in the present day, Spinoza was undoubtedly rational in adhering to such a, seemingly, strange view. A central part of why Spinoza held to his monism is his belief that substances cannot produce other substances. His argument for this view is rather interesting.


Spinoza asserts that substances cannot produce other substances in Proposition IV; here is his argument: “It is impossible that there should be . . . two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be produced by the other,” (Ethics, Prop. VI). Proposition III is essential for understanding Spinoza’s argument: “Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other,” (Ethics, Prop. III). His reasoning for this is that the effect must have its being in the cause in some way otherwise it seems the effect is not really caused by the cause. Spinoza’s definition of substance is also critical for understanding the argument: “By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception,” (Ethics, Def. III)With this in mind, Spinoza’s reasoning is clear. The reason why Spinoza thinks that substances cannot produce other substances is that substances must be things which can be “conceived through” themselves (Ethics, Def. III). This requires that substances be ontologically independent entities, but this, for Spinoza, requires that substances have nothing in common with each other. However, this requires that one substance not cause another substance as effects must be in their cause in some way, but this is impossible as in order for a substance to be a substance it must be able to be thought of in itself, but this impossible for effects as they can only be conceived of in relation to their causes. It follows from this that substances cannot produce other substances.


This argument seems plausible within Spinoza’s framework, but there seems to be a faulty assumption in Spinoza’s account of substance. Spinoza says that a substance is a thing “of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception,” but this seems incomplete (Ethics, Def. III). In order for Spinoza’s argument to work it needs to be the case that in order to be a substance, or an entity “which is in itself,” that conceptual oneness between entities entails that there is metaphysical or ontological oneness between entities, but this is far from clear (Ethics, Def. III). It seems rather plausible, at least prima facie, that the conceptual oneness of the yellowness of a taxi and a paint can does not entail the ontological oneness of the yellowness of the taxi and paint can. After all, it truly seems that one can conceive of the taxi without also conceiving of the paint can. So, while Spinoza’s argument is interesting and is certainly worthy of engagement, it ultimately seems to fail since it seems to rely on the identity of metaphysical and conceptual oneness, which is far from obvious.


Source:

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm

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