A Simple Thomistic Argument Against Contemporary Platonism

Contemporary Platonism holds that there are abstract objects which exist necessarily and a se and explain the commonality between particulars. This version of Platonism is considered to be a significant threat to theism. While contemporary Platonism would not rule out theism, many theists think that it would challenge the uniqueness of God as He would just be one among an infinity of necessarily existing, a se existents. 


As someone who holds to the Thomistic view of existence, I don’t perceive contemporary Platonism as a significant threat because the Thomistic view entails that the only thing that can exist a se is existence itself. In this post, I will not argue against the existence of abstract objects or even that they exist of necessity, I will simply argue that contemporary Platonism does pose a threat to Thomists.


On the Thomistic view, existence is, conceived of in itself, contains within it all conceptual content and essence is no more than the mere limit on existence which gives rise to definite definitional content in the thing. For example, an actual apple in an essence-existence composite where the essence of the apple are simply the limits on the apple’s act of existence which, when conjoined to that act of existence, gives rise to the apple with its definite definitional content. What it is important to note here is that in the apple, existence is absolutely fundamental for without the act of existence the essence of the apple could not be actual: the essence of the apple is logically posterior to the act of existence for the act of existence has conceptual content in itself, while the essence does not. 


Now we can apply this to abstract objects. The contemporary Platonist claims that abstract objects exist a se, through themselves, and wholly independently, but this is simply impossible on the Thomistic view of existence. For the Thomist, the only thing that can exist a se would be existence itself as it, the thing, would be pure existence and so would have existence in itself, but everything else would have existence from another as these things would have their acts of existence limited and so what they are, their essence, would need to be actualized by existence in order to exist. Given this, contemporary Platonism cannot function on Thomism as abstract objects clearly have essences as they have definite definitional content and so they can’t exist through themselves.


This line of argumentation requires the Thomistic view of existence and I will argue for that in later posts, but I think this shows that contemporary Platonism is not a serious threat to Thomism.

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