A Response to Fales on Aquinas on the Problem of Evil

I recently came upon a critique of Aquinas’ response to the problem of evil and I wanted to share some thoughts on it (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4KO0YjGfF0c&t=380s).

 

Firstly, I would say that his description of why Aquinas thinks that there is no best of all possible worlds is right. However, Fales' response seems to insinuate that this is Aquinas' response to Fales' version of the problem of evil, but it isn't. Fundamentally, Aquinas thinks that simply does not have to create a best of all possible worlds (see here: https://disputedquestionsblog.com/2018/12/11/is-god-obligated-to-create-the-best-possible-world-disputed-questions-article-one/). Aquinas' reason for this is that since God is perfect He has a perfect will and so His will will just move towards the highest good out of metaphysical necessity, but God is the highest good since He is the Good so there is nothing outside of God that can necessitate the Divine Will. Aquinas shares the intuition behind Fales' argument: that God must do the best possible thing. Where they differ is in identifying what object God's will will be oriented to as a result.

 

Fales' point about a perfect creature, to my mind, shows that he either doesn't understand perfection on the Thomistic view or he is simply trying to give an undercutting defeater and I think it is the later. For Aquinas, only the uncreated can be perfect as the uncreated would be being itself and the created is necessarily imperfect as, by being created, it is not being itself but rather receives its being from something else, namely God. There cannot be an infinitely good creature on the Thomistic view as this would require the created to be the uncreated and have its being in itself, but by its nature of being created, it is necessarily imperfect. I should also mention that for Aquinas, being is identical to goodness and so a creature who has its being from another will necessarily have its goodness from another, which means that it can't be infinitely good as this creature is, necessarily, not being itself.

 

With regard to his response to the omnipotence objection, it seems that his point misses the mark as if they will always be in harmony then it seems that it would be impossible for one of the omnipotent beings to limit the power of the other, which means that at least of these beings is not omnipotent since it lacks some power. Now, it may be the case that they have some sort of contract where they agree never to use this power even though they have it, which I suppose its possible, although it seems that you would still have the problem that one omnipotent being could limit the power of the other, but perhaps that way is more fruitful for Fales.

Comments

  1. Thoughts In ViaFebruary 23, 2022 at 11:20 AM

    Hi, this is Harrison from the Disputed Questions blog. Glad to have found your site, you're doing some good work!

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    1. The Engaged ThomistOctober 16, 2022 at 7:05 AM

      Hi Harrison, thanks so much for your comment and sorry for my late reply; I'm just seeing this now for the first time. It means a lot to me that you have found my blog useful as I have greatly benefited from your work. God Bless.

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