A Response to a Critique of the First Way

I recently came upon an interesting critique of the First Way and I gave a response to it online (see here: https://www.reddit.com/r/DebateAnAtheist/comments/s5q73t/double_murder_better_places_to_stab_at_aquinas/)  I’ll post the original post below and then my response.

Original Post

Aquinas' First Way, like many other cosmological arguments, can be split into two stages. The first stage of the argument merely tries to show that there's an unmoved mover or an unactualized actualizer. The second stage tries to explore more of the characteristics of this unmoved mover such as whether it's a mind, omnipotent, omniscient, etc.

How Should We Even Understand the Argument?

First, we need to find a good formulation of the argument. Let's see what Thomas Aquinas himself has to say:

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality…Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Summa Theogica, 1.2.3, trl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

Graham Oppy tries to give a formulation of the First Way in his book Arguing About Gods:

1. Some things are in a process of change.

2. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.

3. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.

4. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

Oppy thinks that this argument is invalid. He does not think that there is anything in the premises which justifies the conclusion that there is a unique first cause of change that is itself changeless. However, McNabb and DeVito do not think that Poppy has given a charitable formulation of Aquinas' argument. There is no explicit phrase which states that the first mover must be changeless, but it is arguably implied. For if something is in motion, it requires a mover. If an infinite regress of changers(in the per se sense) is impossible, then there's a first mover(if we get rid of circular causation). Since this first mover is the source of motion, it would have to not be in motion, otherwise, it'd have to be moved by something more fundamental.

 

A better formulation of the argument would one like the formulation Brian Davies made:

 

1 Everything that is moved is moved by another.

2 Some things are obviously in motion (are moved) and are therefore moved by something else.

3 What moves something else is either moved or not moved.

4 If what moves something else is not moved, then there is an unmoved mover, which is what God is supposed to be.

5 If what moves something else is moved, it is moved by another mover.

6 There cannot be an infinite number of things moving other things while themselves being moved by other things.

7 So we must posit “some prime unmoved mover.”

Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary (UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 37.

 

A more valid formulation of Oppy's attempt using Davies articulation as a model would look something like this:

 

1 Some things are in a process of change.

2 Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.

3 What moves something else is either moved or not moved.

4 An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.

5 Hence There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

 

Defining Motion

 

Many critics of Aquinas' First Way seem to misunderstand what Aquinas means by motion. While change in spatial location is included in the definition of motion, the Latin word motus does not seem limited to the English word. A better word would be change. There are three different types of motus which are change in quality, change in quantity, and change in place as Anthony Kenny puts it.

One may be tempted to argue that objects can be in a process of change without that change being sustained by another. We could look towards Newtonian inertia. If an object is in motion, it will stay in motion unless acted on by an unbalanced force. So, it seems that an object can maintain its change in location without another object putting it in motion. Thus, we have some good reason to reject premise two, at least in the sense that an object doesn't require concurrent causal sustenance of its change.

 

Feser however thinks that the Thomist can still save the argument. Feser argues that we need to see inertia as a state of stasis. An object in constant motion may be changing in relation to other objects, but it itself is not experiencing intrinsic change. There seems to be no motion in this context(in the Aristotelian sense). Thomist can reconcile the causal principle of the First Way with mechanical inertia. Now, it may be the case that if an object accelerates, then the object would be in motion in the relevant Aristotelian sense, but this is again compatible with Newtonian laws. An object requires an unbalanced force for it to accelerate. Feser writes:

Precisely because the principle of inertia treats uniform local motion as a ‘state,’ it treats it thereby as the absence of change. … In this case, the question of how the principle of motion and the principle of inertia relate to one another does not even arise, for there just is no motion (in the relevant, Aristotelian sense) going on in the first place when all an object is doing is ‘moving’ inertially in the Newtonian sense. To be sure, acceleration would in this case involve motion in the Aristotelian sense, but as we have seen, since Newtonian physics itself requires a cause for accelerated motion, there is not even a prima facie conflict with the Aristotelian principle of motion. (2013, pp. 239, 250-251)

Actuality and Potentiality

 

I didn't include actuality and potency in the formulations above, but these terms do play an essential role in classical arguments, especially in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. Here are some examples to illustrate what these terms mean. A seed has the potentiality to become a tree. A man has the actuality of being pale, but the potentiality to be tanned. A student has the potentiality to learn a language, and the teacher actually knows the language. The First Way will argue that change is the actualization of a potential, like when a teacher actualizes the potentiality of a student to learn a language.

 

If we wanted to make a more complex formulation involving potentiality and actuality, it may look like something like this. Joe Schmid is responsible for this particular formulation.

1. Some things change.

2. But change is the reduction of potential to actual.

3. Therefore, some things reduce from potential to actual.(This just means that some potentialities are actualized.)

4. Whatever reduces from potential to actual is actualized by some other actually existent thing.

5. Therefore, some things are actualized by some other actually existent things.

6. If some things are actualized by some other actually existent things, then there are chains of changes subordinated per se.(Per se chains will be explored later in the post)

7. Therefore, there are chains of changes subordinated per se.

8. If such chains were infinitely long, then there would be no first member in the series of changes.

9. But if there were no first member in the series of changes, there would be no subsequent changes.

10. But if some things change, then there are subsequent changes.

11. Therefore there are subsequent changes.

12. Therefore, it is not the case that such chains of changes are infinitely long.

13. If it is not the case that such chains of changes are infinitely long, then such chains terminate in one first member(unactualized actualizer).

14. If such chains terminate in one first member, then God exists.

15. Therefore, God exists.

One of the later conclusions of the First Way is that there is a being of pure actuality, utterly devoid of any potential. A being which is totally unchangeable. It is impossible for this being to exist in any other manner. One objection made by some is that God has the potential to refrain from creating the world, the potentiality to create a different world, etc. Therefore, there is no being of pure actuality. However, this objection misunderstands the difference between passive potencies and active potencies.

 

Active potencies are the inner powers of an agent to exercise some action. God has the active potency to create some other possible world, but this is not incompatible with what classical theists are trying to prove. They are trying to prove that there's a being devoid of passive potencies. Passive potencies are the capacity to receive some sort of intrinsic change. God can't suddenly gain more power because he's immutable(unchangeable), but he can still create in a different manner.

 

Per Se vs. Per Accidens

 

Another common criticism made by a lot of non-theists is that the argument doesn't give proper justification for why there can't be an infinite chain of changers. For all we know, the universe could be eternal. This objection may work against Kalam-style cosmological arguments, but it doesn't work against classical arguments, particularly against Aquinas' first three ways. To understand why this criticism doesn't work, we have to point out the difference between Per se chains of causation and Per Accidens chains of causation.

 

Thomists will often say that Per Accidens(accidentally ordered series) chains of causation are linear. They are changes through time. Here's an example of a Per Accidens chain of causation. A father has a son, and that son in turn has a son. While it may be the case that the grandson would've never existed had the grandfather never exercised his causal powers, the grandson does not depend on the grandfather's concurrent causal activity for his very existence or change. If the grandfather ceased to exist, the grandson can still continue existing and changing.

 

Per Se(essentially ordered series) chains of causation are different however. They are hierarchical in nature. One example which is often used by classical theist philosophers is a rock which is in turn being moved by a stick which is in turn being moved by a hand. The change, or motion, of the rock, is dependant on the causal activity of the hand. It is derivative. Intermediate causes can only have causal powers insofar as they derive them from preceding causes. Another way to explain Per Se chains of causation is that these causes are sustaining causes of change.

 

Aquinas never actually says that time cannot be infinite in the past, nor does he state that accidentally ordered series must be finite. He has never stated that there are problems with infinite series in themselves. He only thinks that essentially ordered series cannot be infinite. One way to think about the impossibility of an infinite essentially ordered series is an infinite row of box cars. An infinite row of box cars seemingly shouldn't be in motion. If there were no engine, what exactly could account for the motion of the box cars without some sort of first mover? Another example one could use is an infinite chain. Let's say that there's a light which is being hung by a chain. But what is accounting for the hanging of the chains? These chains seem to require some sort of stable ceiling. The chains by themselves shouldn't be able to account for why the light hangs, for the chains only have the power to hang things in virtue of the thing which is hanging the chain itself. Another conceivable example could be an infinite circuit. Say there's an infinite wire or circuit which is powering some sort of device. But what could account for the power? Surely there must be some sort of power source.

 

But perhaps these analogies aren't very convincing. Perhaps we can explain the pattern of all these scenarios which were explained above. As explained by Cohoe:

The wholly derivative nature of these series is the principal reason that each must have a first and independent member. You cannot give what you do not have. Each of the intermediate members of the series exercises a causal power that it possesses derivatively. Since the series are wholly derivative, each member in the series only has what it has via its dependence on all the previous members. It has to be receiving in order to give and there must be a source that accounts for what it receives. If there is no first non-derivative member of the series, then there is no such source. Each member of the series either has the causal power it is exercising derivatively or non-derivatively. If the series has no first independent member, then no member has the power it is exercising non-derivatively.

Now one may object that every finite chain of dependency must terminate in a first unchanged changer, but an infinite chain need not terminate in a first member. Each member has another member which it can sufficiently depend on. A link in an infinite chain for instance is simply held up by a prior chain, and is arguably sufficiently explained as to why it is being held up. Cohoe thinks this objection is mistaken however.

In essentially ordered series, by contrast, the later members depend directly on (and derive their membership from) all the earlier members: (v→(w→(x→y))). The dependency does not terminate at the previous member but continues until we come to a first, independent member. Knowing that a ring is held up by the previous ring or that a train car is pulled by the previous one does not on its own establish whether the ring can be held up or whether the train car is moving, because the previous members in these cases are intermediate members. An infinite series of intermediate members gets one no closer to resolution than a finite series does: both need a first, non-derivative member.

An objection which seems to have a bit more weight is to doubt whether there are per se chains of causation in the first place. Consider for instance Aquinas' example of the hand moving the stick which in turn moves a rock which in turn moves a leaf. One could argue that the reason why these objects stop moving or changing is not because these objects require concurrent causal activity from the hand in the Per Se sense, but because there are causally preventative conditions which stop them from further changing or being in motion. For instance, the force of friction can be said to prevent the objects from moving. So it seems that this seemingly Per Se chain of causation is really just a Per Accidens chain of causation. However, this might not be the best objection to use as there are other analogies which the classical theist could make to avoid the problems of the one mentioned above. Plus Ed Feser himself responds to this kind of reasoning when trying to rebut objections to the Aristotilean proof:

The first of several points to make in response to all of this is that it is simply a mistake to think that being simultaneous entails being instantaneous. An event like someone’s using a stick to move a stone is of course spread out through time rather than occurring in a single instant. But to say that the motion of the stick and that o f the stone are simultaneous is not in the first place to say that they occur in a single instant. It is rather to say that the stick’s moving the stone and the stone’s being moved by the stick are part o f the same one event, however long this event lasts. As Clarke (citing a different example) points out, “ It indeed takes me time to push a chair across the room; but there is no time at all between my pushing the chair and the chair being pushed.” 34

Other Objections

 

Special Pleading

 

A not so good objection to Aquinas' First Way is that it commits special pleading. People who make this objection argue that God is given special exemption from the causal principle of the First Way(whatever is being changed is being changed by another). This objection however is severely mistaken. The God of classical theism isn't being given some arbitrary exemption from the causal principle given. God, in the classical theist model, is said to be immutable. God is changeless, and is unchangeable. Why would God need some mover if God is not in a state of motion? In fact, the objection misunderstands the very point of the argument. The whole point of the argument is to prove that there is a being which is not in a state of change or motion. To say that God needs a mover is simply an immense misunderstanding of the argument.

Quantum Mechanics

 

Another objection which arguably doesn't succeed is one from quantum mechanics. One may argue that particles can decay randomly, and thus refutes the causal principle that things can be in motion without some outside changer. This objection also seems mistaken. For one, this seems to rely on an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, and while it is a valid interpretation, it by no means is universally supported, and the empirical evidence isn't sufficient enough to confirm which interpretation is correct, so we shouldn't really rely on this point as a defeater. Another potential mistake made by the person who makes this objection is that they misunderstand what it means for something to be indeterministic. It may be the case that the decay of a particle or the spontaneous appearance of a virtual particle isn't necessitated by prior causal conditions, but it doesn't follow that it doesn't depend on prior causal conditions at all. Indeterminism merely entails that a different set of effects could've obtained. It doesn't entail that per se changes can come about without an actualizer.

 

Aquinas didn't know about modern physics

 

This is true, but this objection is meaningless. It doesn't attack any of the premises. It's just an ad hominem attack.

 

The argument is a word salad

 

This barely even counts as an argument. It's just an opinion. It doesn't even try to attack any of the premises, and it doesn't show that any of the premises are false.

Main Criticisms of the Argument(Stage One of the Argument)

The Unmoved Mover can still move

 

The classical theist reading this may jump out and say that the argument clearly proves that there must be an unmoved mover, and as it says in the very title, it cannot move. It's true that the unmoved mover can't move in the per se sense, but why can't it move in the per accidens sense or perhaps in the context of a non-essentially ordered series? Josh Rasmussen makes this objection:

One recently articulated problem for the First Way is "the challenge of a explaining why a first cause in an essentially ordered series could not have been caused by things within a non-essentially ordered series.

It indeed may be the case the unmoved mover can't further have some causal power which it derives from some other source with respect to the relavant per se chain, but it does not follow that it therefore can't have been caused in the context of a non-essentially ordered series. Let's use the grandfather, father, and son example to illustrate the point. Let's say that the son is the source of some causal power in some per se chain of change. The son however still has a cause of his very existence which is only true in the per accidens sense. The son can also change in the per accidens sense, just like one billard ball moves another billard ball in the context of time. The son can in principle still be apart of a greater causal network, but in the per accidens sense, or in the context of whatever other non-essentially ordered series. This chain could also in principle go back infinitely. As has been stated before, Aquinas never had anything against the existence of an infinite temporal series, or even an infinite causal series. The only thing which Aquinas did allow for is the existence of an infinite long essentially ordered series.

 

Unactualized Actualizer is not of Pure Actuality

 

Another relavant point in establishing the First Way argument is getting the jump from an unmoved mover, or an unactualized actualizer, to a single,unique, immovable mover, or a purely actual actualizer. This jump made in the First Way seems to be unjustified. Just because the terminating first member of some per se chain of change does not change or derive some power with respect to the relavant chain at time t, it doesn't follow that it couldn't derive that power at some other time or in some other possible world. We can only infer that at some time t, the terminating first member of some per se chain is unchanged in the sense that it is the source of change at the that time. However, it could very well be metaphysically possible that it derived that power in some other possible world. Some X could be the source to sustain change in some per se chain of change at time t, and then perhaps lose the capability of being the source some time other than t and derive power from some Y.

 

Just because the terminating first member of some per se chain of change does not change or derive some power with respect to the relavant chain, it doesn't follow that it doesn't have potentials in other respects. We can reuse the engine and box car example from earlier to illustrate the point. Let's say that an engine is the source of motion and change with respect to pulling box cars on some railway. It doesn't follow that the engine is incapable of changing in some respect which has nothing to do with the per se chain of causation which concurrently sustains the motion of the box cars. For all we know, the engine could have the potential to turn from blue to red.

One principle which certain classical theist thinkers bring up to try and defend that this being is not merely unmoved, but also immovable in certain or all respects is Agere Sequitur Esse. This is latin for action follows being. The principle roughly says that the way a thing operates reflects its mode of being. One thing we can ask about this principle though is, why should we accept it? What justification or support does it have? Here is what Ed Feser has to say on the principle:

The basic idea is that what a thing does necessarily reflects what it is. Eyes and ears function differently because they are structured differently. Plants take in nutrients, grow, and reproduce while stones do none of these things, because the former are living things and the latter are inanimate. And so forth. The thesis that agere sequitur esse can be understood as an application, in the context of what Aristotelian philosophers call formal causes, of the basic idea that the PPC expresses with respect to efficient causes. An efficient cause is what brings about the existence of something or a change in something. The PPC tells us, again, that whatever is in the thing that changes or comes to exist must in some way have been in the total set of factors that brought about this change or existent. In this sense, the effect cannot go beyond the cause. A formal cause is the nature of a thing, that which makes it the kind of thing it is. For example, being a rational animal is the nature o f a human being. The characteristic attributes and activities of a thing flow or follow from its nature— as, for instance, the use of language flows from our nature as rational animals. The principle agere sequitur esse basically says that these attributes and activities can not go beyond that nature, any more than an effect can go beyond its efficient cause.

Feser then goes on to give some examples where agere sequitur esse is applied such as the human soul and whether it can survive death, but I won't get into that here. If agere sequitur esse is only saying that a thing cannot go beyond its nature, then I'm not sure how it's relavant to the objection we're bringing up. The objection is that there could be potentialities which have nothing to do with the relavant chain of change.

 

We should arguably be agnostic as to what this unactualized actualizer's nature is. We haven't observed its nature nor any of its attributes, so how can we be sure if the way it acts is outside of its causal powers were it to have irrelavant potentialities?

 

Feser also says something in response to this objection in the first chapter of his book, but because it deals with principles which are more applicable to his Aristotilean proof rather the Aquinas' original first way, I won't deal with that objection here, but if someone asks for my refutation in the comments, I'll gladly give it. The principle not only suggests that things require concurrent sustainers for change, but also that they require concurrent efficient sustaining causes for a thing's very existence.

 

Stage Two Criticisms

Unity(Uniqueness)

 

By unified, I simply refer to the claim that per se chains of change converge and terminate into a singular, purely actual actualizer. I believe that the justifications for this are insufficient, and thus, the argument fails. Here is the justification which Feser attempts to give in his Aristotilean proof, although such justifications are usually applied to the original First Way as well.

Could there be more than one such cause? There could not, not even in principle. For there can be two or more of a kind only if there is something to differentiate them, something that one instance has that the others lack. And there can be no such differentiating feature where something purely actual is concerned. Thus, we typically distinguish the things of our experience by their material or temporal features— by one thing being larger or smaller than another, say, or taller or shorter than another, or existing at a time before or after another. But since what is purely actual is immaterial and eternal, one purely actual thing could not be differentiated from another in terms of such features. More generally, two or more things of a kind are to be differentiated in terms of some perfection or privation that one has and the other lacks. We might say, for instance, that this tree’s roots are more sturdy than that one’s, or that this squirrel is lacking its tail while the other has its tail. But as we have seen, what is purely actual is completely devoid of any privation and is maximal in perfection. Hence, there can be no way in principle to differentiate one purely actual cause from another in terms of their respective perfections or privations. But then such a cause possesses the attribute of unity— that is to say, there cannot be, even in principle, more than one purely actual cause. Hence, it is the same one unactualized actualizer to which all things owe their existence.

Feser is going off the assumption here that there is something of pure actuality, and he then tries to show that this purely actual actualizer has certain attributes such as immateriality, perfection, and eternality. Perhaps in this defense of unity or uniqueness, we could question the claim that in order to distinguish between two of a kind, there must be some feature or perfection which the other lacks. Unless if I'm mistaken, Feser doesn't seem to give any sort of justification for such a principle. I won't however stick by this objection, for it could potentially just be overly skeptical. Instead, I will try and respond to the formal version of the argument, and respond to the defenses that this thing is eternal, immaterial, etc in order to show that Feser's assumptions of these attributes are unjustified.

15. In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the others lack.

16. But there could be such a differentiating feature only if a purely actual actualizer had some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have.

17. So, there can be no such differentiating feature, and thus no way for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer.

18. So, there is only one purely actual actualizer

These premises come before the premises which defend immateriality, eternality, etc, so I will respond accordingly. I can agree with premise 15, but premise 16 seems unjustified. Just because an object lacks certain features, it doesn't follow that it has some sort of unactualized potential. For instance, a submarine lacks certain features of a human, but it would be false to say that a submarine has the potentiality to gain certain features which humans bear. It seems in principle possible to say that an object remains both unchanging and unchangeable even if it lacks some property the other purely actual actualizer has because it could be in the very nature of the first purely actual actualizer to lack a property the second one has. So it seems that the defense of the Unity of this purely actual actualizer fails.

 

Timelessness

 

Feser then argues for the eternality of the Purely Actual Actualizer, in the timeless sense.

Since existing within time entails changeability, an immutable cause must also be eternal in the sense o f existing outside o f time altogether. It neither comes to be nor passes away but simply is, timelessly, without beginning or end.

Existing in time need not entail intrinsic change. At most, it only entails succession or cambridge change. Plus, some classical theists have stated that God is capable of extrinsic change, so it's hard to see why its problematic for a thing to experience succession as long as its not intrinsically changing.

 

Immateriality

 

As you guessed, Feser argues for the immateriality, or incorporeality, of the Purely Actual Actualizer.

Since to be material entails being changeable and existing within time, an immutable and eternal cause must be immaterial and thus incorporeal or without any sort of body.

Firstly, the inference to timelessness fails, so it's still an open question as to whether or not this purely actual actualizer is in time, so it can still be material. Secondly, even if the inference to timelessness succeeded, this defense still couldn't work. Why can't there be timeless material? Nothing about this seems incoherent. Unless if I'm mistaken, Feser doesn't seem to give extra justification for this assumption. Thirdly, why must material things be changeable? Perhaps Feser can point to scientific data showing that all material things in our experience change, but this jump seems unjustified. Science as of right now only tells us about the nature of non-fundamental material things. The nature of the most fundamental material things is something which arguably has not been fully discovered by science.

 

Perfection

 

Feser's inference to the Purely Actual Actualizer being perfect may actually be a good one, but only if he can show that the unmoved mover is in fact unchangeable, which he has not.

Consider now what it is for a thing to be in some respect or other imperfect or flawed. An injured animal or damaged plant is imperfect insofar as it is no longer capable of realizing fully the ends its nature has set for it. For instance, a squirrel which has been hit by a car may be unable to run away from predators as swiftly as it needs to; and a tree whose roots have been damaged may be unstable or unable to take in all the water and nutrients it needs in order to remain healthy. A defect o f this sort is (to use some traditional philosophical jargon) a privation, the absence o f some feature a thing would naturally require so as to be complete. It involves the failure to realize some potential inherent in a thing. Something is perfect, then, to the extent that it has actualized such potentials and is without privations. But then a purely actual cause o f things, precisely since it is purely actual and thus devoid o f unrealized potentiality or privation, possesses maximal perfection.

If the unmoved mover is in fact of pure actuality, then it cannot have the potentiality to further perfect itself within the context of its own nature. That is why I think Feser's inference from pure actuality to perfection works, but as mentioned before, this only works if you accept that the jump from unmoved mover to immovable mover works. Plus, the nature of this perfect immovable mover doesn't have to resemble anything which Feser claims it does. By showing that his inferences to immateriality and eternality don't work, it in fact remains a possibility that there is a perfect, material, and temporal purely actual actualizer.

 

Omnipotence

 

Feser writes:

Consider now that to have power is just to be able to make something happen, to actualize some potential. But then, since the cause of the existence of all things is pure actuality itself rather than merely one actual thing among others, and it is the source of all the actualizing power anything else has, it has all possible power. It is omnipotent

This inference requires that the purely actual actualizer is unique, or unified, which seems to fail, at least by my lights. It need not be the single source of all actualizing power if there's more than one purely actual actualizer. Another thing to point out is that Feser's definition of omnipotence may not be a good one. For one thing, while the purely actual actualizer is the source of all power present in the actual world, it need not have the direct causal power to actualize all conceivable states of affairs. It might only have the direct causal power to create a machine, which in turn has the direct causal power to actualize any state of affairs except deriving power from itself. It seems that the machine is the omnipotent thing, but according to Feser's definition, because the machine derives power from the purely actual actualizer(which only has the direct causal power to create the machine), the purely actual actualizer is the omnipotent thing.

 

Goodness

 

I won't really bother giving much of a refutation here. It's quite similar to the reasoning for proving the perfection of God. Because the purely actual actualizer is devoid of potentiality, and thus deficiency, it is good. This, of course, cannot be used to prove God's moral perfection, at least in the way people typically conceive of moral perfection. I will say that Feser's inference does work, but like before with perfection, the inference only works if we bridge the gap between an unmoved mover, and a purely actual actualizer, and in my lights, the gap has not been bridged.

 

Intelligence(Mindedness)

 

Feser writes:

For a cause cannot give what it does not have to give. This is sometimes called the principle of proportionate causality......

When I myself have a $20 bill ready to hand and I cause you to have it, what is in the effect was in the cause formally, to use some traditional jargon. That is to say, I myself was an instance of the form or pattern of having a $20 bill, and I caused you to become another instance of that form or pattern. When I don’t have the $20 bill ready to hand but I do have at least $20 credit in my bank account, you might say that what was in the effect was in that case virtually. And when I get Congress to grant me the power to manufacture $20 bills, you might say (once again to use some traditional jargon) that I had the $20 eminently. Because in that case, I not only have the power to acquire already existing $20 bills, but the more “ eminent” power o f causing them to exist in the first place.......

That is to say, to cause something to exist is just to cause something having a certain form or fitting a certain pattern. But as we have just said, the purely actual cause of things is the cause of every possible thing— every possible cat, every possible tree, every possible stone. It is for that reason the cause of every possible form or pattern a thing might have. We have also noted that whatever is in an effect must in some way or other be in its cause. Put these points together and what follows is that the forms or patterns of things must exist in the purely actual cause of things; and they must exist in it in a completely universal or abstract way, because this cause is the cause of every possible thing fitting a certain form or pattern. But to have forms or patterns in this universal or abstract way is just to have that capacity which is fundamental to intelligence.

It seems that Feser's inference to intelligence here is mistaken. Just because this purely actual actualizer has the power to cause something to fit a certain form or pattern, it doesn't seem to follow that these things somehow exist in the purely actual actualizer in an abstract or universal way. It only follows that this being has the active potency to produce things which fit a certain form or pattern. At most, we can infer that it has the power eminently to create these things. If Feser's inference to intelligence fails, then his inference to omniscience also seems to fail, so I won't really include a separate section for omniscience.

My Response

Very nice post, as always; I like the formatting too. I think that the best and most accurate reading of the First Way would be the existential reading of it. Gaven Kerr would be a good person to go to for this reading (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAEXK8_vpcU). The idea is that in De Ente et Essentia Aquinas says that essence relates to existence as potency does to act so when he talks about act and potency in the argument think about it in terms of essence and existence; again, Kerr is great here. When this is done, I think the argument takes a very similar form to the De Ente argument and I think it is fine as Aquinas calls them "Five Ways" rather than "Five Proofs" on purpose as they are five variations or formulations of the same proof. I would like to deal a bit with your objections and when I do just assume that I am reading the First Way as a variation on the De Ente proof.

"The classical theist reading this may jump out and say that the argument clearly proves that there must be an unmoved mover, and as it says in the very title, it cannot move. It's true that the unmoved mover can't move in the per se sense, but why can't it move in the per accident sense or perhaps in the context of a non-essentially ordered series? Josh Rasmussen makes this objection: 

'One recently articulated problem for the First Way is the challenge of explaining why a first cause in an essentially ordered series could not have been caused by things within a non-essentially ordered series.' 

It indeed may be the case the unmoved mover can't further have some causal power which it derives from some other source with respect to the relevant per se chain, but it does not follow that it therefore can't have been caused in the context of a non-essentially ordered series. Let's use the grandfather, father, and son example to illustrate the point. Let's say that the son is the source of some causal power in some per se chain of change. The son however still has a cause of his very existence which is only true in the per accidents sense. The son can also change in the per-incident sense, just like one billiard ball moves another billiard ball in the context of time. The son can in principle still be a part of a greater causal network, but in the per accidents sense, or in the context of whatever other non-essentially ordered series. This chain could also in principle go back infinitely. As has been stated before, Aquinas never had anything against the existence of an infinite temporal series, or even an infinite causal series. The only thing which Aquinas did allow for is the existence of an infinite long essentially ordered series."

If I am not mistaken, this is very similar to what Joe lays out in his critique of the First Way (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkG-MlZqjRg&t=1185s). My issue with this objection would be that it assumes a non-existential interpretation of the First Way. I would agree that if we were to take Aristotle's argument, which is very similar to the one you and the people you cite give, then we would only get to a being that is purely actual or perhaps even just actual in one sense, but could be in potency in other respects. However, when we take the existential interpretation into account, this objection goes away as the relevant casualty in the series will be existence and, for St. Thomas, existence is absolutely foundational in the thing and so, for him, any other particular actuality that a thing has will be derivative of the actual existence that it has. Given this, if the existential reading is given, the conclusion of the argument would be a being who is unmoved with respect to existence and so would not be lacking in any actuality as all other actualities are derivative from existence.

"Another relevant point in establishing the First Way argument is getting the jump from an unmoved mover, or an unactualized actualizer, to a single,unique, immovable mover, or a purely actual actualizer. This jump made in the First Way seems to be unjustified. Just because the terminating first member of some per se chain of change does not change or derive some power with respect to the relevant chain at time t, it doesn't follow that it couldn't derive that power at some other time or in some other possible world. We can only infer that at some time t, the terminating first member of some per se chain is unchanged in the sense that it is the source of change at that time. However, it could very well be metaphysically possible that it derived that power in some other possible world. Some X could be the source to sustain change in some per se chain of change at time t, and then perhaps lose the capability of being the source some time other than t and derive power from some Y. Just because the terminating first member of some per se chain of change does not change or derive some power with respect to the relevant chain, it doesn't follow that it doesn't have potential in other respects. We can reuse the engine and box car example from earlier to illustrate the point. Let's say that an engine is the source of motion and change with respect to pulling box cars on some railway. It doesn't follow that the engine is incapable of changing in some respect which has nothing to do with the per se chain of causation which concurrently sustains the motion of the box cars. For all we know, the engine could have the potential to turn from blue to red."

I feel that this is very similar to your previous point so I will just point back to what I said before.

"One principle which certain classical theist thinkers bring up to try and defend that this being is not merely unmoved, but also immovable in certain or all respects is Agere Sequitur Esse. This is latin for action follows being. The principle roughly says that the way a thing operates reflects its mode of being. One thing we can ask about this principle though is, why should we accept it? What justification or support does it have? Here is what Ed Feser has to say on the principle: 'The basic idea is that what a thing does necessarily reflects what it is. Eyes and ears function differently because they are structured differently. Plants take in nutrients, grow, and reproduce while stones do none of these things, because the former are living things and the latter are inanimate. And so forth. The thesis that agere sequitur esse can be understood as an application, in the context of what Aristotelian philosophers call formal causes, of the basic idea that the PPC expresses with respect to efficient causes. An efficient cause is what brings about the existence of something or a change in something. The PPC tells us, again, that whatever is in the thing that changes or comes to exist must in some way have been in the total set of factors that brought about this change or existent. In this sense, the effect cannot go beyond the cause. A formal cause is the nature of a thing, that which makes it the kind of thing it is. For example, being a rational animal is the nature of human beings. The characteristic attributes and activities of a thing flow or follow from its nature— as, for instance, the use of language flows from our nature as rational animals. The principle agere sequitur esse basically says that these attributes and activities can not go beyond that nature, any more than an effect can go beyond its efficient cause.' Feser then goes on to give some examples where agere sequitur esse is applied such as the human soul and whether it can survive death, but I won't get into that here. If agere sequitur esse is only saying that a thing cannot go beyond its nature, then I'm not sure how it's relevant to the objection we're bringing up. The objection is that there could be potentialities which have nothing to do with the relevant chain of change."

I think this would count as a kind of response to what I wrote to your previous objection. I think Feser is good as an introduction to this principle, but not the best for a robust defense. I would just say that agere sequitur esse just means that whatever a thing can do and whatever actualities that a thing possesses flows from its being. In a way it is saying that a thing cannot go beyond its nature but it presupposes a different view of nature, I believe, then the one you are assuming. For Aquinas, the nature of the thing would just be the thing's essence and, for him, essence is nothing more than the mere limit on the thing's existence as existence, in itself, contains within it all conceptual content and so essence is what confines and defines the thing as essence in combination with existence is a thing with definite conceptual content or a definite nature. If that is unclear, please let me know and I will try to be a bit clearer. Given this, I think your last line, "the objection is that there could be potentialities which have nothing to do with the relevant chain of change," seems to misunderstand the principle as this principle assumes that existence is what grounds all another particular actualities in the thing and given that existence is the relevant causality in the series in question, the argument will get you a being which is unmoved with respect to existence and so would be unmoved with respect to that which grounds all actuality in the thing, which would entail that the being one discovers through the argument is indeed purely actual. "We should arguably be agnostic as to what this unactualized actualizer's nature is. We haven't observed its nature nor any of its attributes, so how can we be sure if the way it acts is outside of its causal powers? Was it to have irrelevant potentialities?"

I think this worry goes away given my explanation.

"By unified, I simply refer to the claim that per se chains of change converge and terminate into a singular, purely actual actualizer. I believe that the justifications for this are insufficient, and thus, the argument fails. Here is the justification which Feser attempts to give in his Aristotelian proof, although such justifications are usually applied to the original First Way as well.

'Could there be more than one such cause? There could not, not even in principle. For there can be two or more of a kind only if there is something to differentiate them, something that one instance has that the others lack. And there can be no such differentiating feature where something purely actual is concerned. Thus, we typically distinguish the things of our experience by their material or temporal features— by one thing being larger or smaller than another, say, or taller or shorter than another, or existing at a time before or after another. But since what is purely actual is immaterial and eternal, one purely actual thing could not be differentiated from another in terms of such features. More generally, two or more things of a kind are to be differentiated in terms of some perfection or privation that one has and the other lacks. We might say, for instance, that this tree’s roots are more sturdy than that one’s, or that this squirrel is lacking its tail while the other has its tail. But as we have seen, what is purely actual is completely devoid of any privation and is maximal in perfection. Hence, there can be no way in principle to differentiate one purely actual cause from another in terms of their respective perfections or privations. But then such a cause possesses the attribute of unity— that is to say, there cannot be, even in principle, more than one purely actual cause. Hence, it is the same one unactualized actualizer to which all things owe their existence.' 

Feser is going off the assumption here that there is something of pure actuality, and he then tries to show that this purely actual actualizer has certain attributes such as immateriality, perfection, and eternality. Perhaps in this defense of unity or uniqueness, we could question the claim that in order to distinguish between two of a kind, there must be some feature or perfection which the other lacks. Unless I'm mistaken, Feser doesn't seem to give any sort of justification for such a principle. I won't however stick by this objection, for it could potentially just be overly skeptical. Instead, I will try to respond to the formal version of the argument, and respond to the defenses that this thing is eternal, immaterial, etc in order to show that Feser's assumptions of these attributes are unjustified."

I would like to note that I am not trying to defend Feser, but Aquinas as I think he is right, while Feser provides some good work for beginners, but not for a sophisticated defense of Aquinas. I would also just like to note that it seems that my understanding of the First Way would get you to a purely actual actualizer so I will assume that in my further responses. 

"'15. In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the others lack. 

16. But there could be such a differentiating feature only if a purely actual actualizer had some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have. 

17. So, there can be no such differentiating feature, and thus no way for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer. 

18. So, there is only one purely actual actualizer.’

These premises come before the premises which defend immateriality, eternality, etc, so I will respond accordingly. I can agree with premise 15, but premise 16 seems unjustified. Just because an object lacks certain features, it doesn't follow that it has some sort of unactualized potential. For instance, a submarine lacks certain features of a human, but it would be false to say that a submarine has the potentiality to gain certain features which humans bear. It seems in principle possible to say that an object remains both unchanging and unchangeable even if it lacks some property the other purely actual actualizer has because it could be in the very nature of the first purely actual actualizer to lack a property the second one has. So it seems that the defense of the Unity of this purely actual actualizer fails."

So I think your objection to 16 fails to understand the difference between something that is purely actual and something which is not. You say "just because an object lacks certain features, it doesn't follow that it has some sort of unactualized potential," and this may be so, but this seems to be irrelevant as we are not talking about any object, but rather a purely actual one. You then go on to give the example of a submarine and a human, which of course differ because of actual features and not merely potential ones, but this seems to be irrelevant as neither a submarine nor a human are purely actual. You then say "it seems in principle possible to say that an object remains both unchanging and unchangeable even if it lacks some property the other purely actual actualizer has because it could be in the very nature of the first purely actual actualizer to lack a property the second one has," but this seems to misunderstand what it takes for something to be a purely actual actualizer. If something lacks some actuality or property, assuming that this is a positive property, then it isn't purely actual just by definition. A purely actual actualizer would be itself and it seems hard to imagine that there would be two beings which are being itself, after all, there is literally nothing to distinguish the two.

"Feser then argues for the eternality of the Purely Actual Actualizer, in the timeless sense. 'Since existing within time entails changeability, an immutable cause must also be eternal in the sense o f existing outside o f time altogether. It neither comes to be nor passes away but simply is, timelessly, without beginning or end.' Existing in time need not entail intrinsic change. At most, it only entails succession or Cambridge change. Plus, some classical theists have stated that God is capable of extrinsic change, so it's hard to see why it's problematic for a thing to experience succession as long as it's not intrinsically changing."

This seems to misunderstand the Aristotelian view on the relationship between time and change. For Aristotelians as I am sure you know, time is the mere measure of change and change is what grounds the reality of time so if you have a being that cannot change it cannot be in time. Now, as I am sure you know, the Aristotelian view of change is that change is the actualization of a potential so if you had a being that was purely actual and lacked any potency, then it could not change and, given this understanding of the relationship between time and change, could not be in time. You also say that "at most, it only entails succession or Cambridge change," but that seems completely unjustified and you seem to provide no reason for thinking this. It seems that succession requires change, after all, if there are no distinct points in which a being goes from A to B in some respect, then how could there be any successive moments. I'm also unsure how Cambridge change would be caused in itself for a being to be in time as in Cambridge change, one relata does not acquire any new actuality. Also you say: "some classical theists have stated that God is capable of extrinsic change, so it's hard to see why it's problematic for a thing to experience succession as long as it's not intrinsically changing." First of all, all classical theists say that God can undergo extrinsic change and secondly, I'm unsure how undergoing extrinsic change would require one to experience succession, as you seem to imply.

"As you guessed, Feser argues for the immateriality, or incorporeality, of the Purely Actual Actualizer. 'Since to be material entails being changeable and existing within time, an immutable and eternal cause must be immaterial and thus incorporeal or without any sort of body.' Firstly, the inference to timelessness fails, so it's still an open question as to whether or not this purely actual actualizer is in time, so it can still be material."

I think my response to the previous objection is adequate in responding to this one as well.

"Secondly, even if the inference to timelessness succeeded, this defense still couldn't work. Why can't there be timeless material? Nothing about this seems incoherent. Unless I'm mistaken, Feser doesn't seem to give extra justification for this assumption."

The possibility of timeless material seems to require argumentation as this seems to rely on an early modern notion of matter and not an Aristotelian one. Feser does not give an argument for the Aristotelian view here, but he does elsewhere, but I am not interested in defending Feser per se. Timeless matter does not make sense on the Aristotelian view as matter is the principle of potency in things, on this view, and given that potency is what allows for change and, therefore, time, given what I argued above, there can be no such thing as timeless matter on the Aristotelian view.

"Thirdly, why must material things be changeable? Perhaps Feser can point to scientific data showing that all material things in our experience change, but this jump seems unjustified. Science as of right now only tells us about the nature of non-fundamental material things. The nature of the most fundamental material things is something which arguably has not been fully discovered by science."

Again, this seems to just be a dismissal of the Aristotelian view and I'll point to my response to the previous worry for this. Plus, the nature of matter seems to be a philosophical rather than scientific question, although it can surely be informed by scientific data, so it seems perfectly fine to use philosophy in this discussion, not just science.

"Feser's inference to the Purely Actual Actualizer being perfect may actually be a good one, but only if he can show that the unmoved mover is in fact unchangeable, which he has not. 

'Consider now what it is for a thing to be in some respect or other imperfect or flawed. An injured animal or damaged plant is imperfect insofar as it is no longer capable of realizing fully the ends its nature has set for it. For instance, a squirrel which has been hit by a car may be unable to run away from predators as swiftly as it needs to; and a tree whose roots have been damaged may be unstable or unable to take in all the water and nutrients it needs in order to remain healthy. A defect o f this sort is (to use some traditional philosophical jargon) a privation, the absence o f some feature a thing would naturally require so as to be complete. It involves the failure to realize some potential inherent in a thing. Something is perfect, then, to the extent that it has actualized such potentials and is without privations. But then a purely actual cause o f things, precisely since it is purely actual and thus devoid o f unrealized potentiality or privation, possesses maximal perfection.' 

If the unmoved mover is in fact of pure actuality, then it cannot have the potentiality to further perfect itself within the context of its own nature. That is why I think Feser's inference from pure actuality to perfection works, but as mentioned before, this only works if you accept that the jump from unmoved mover to immovable mover works. Plus, the nature of this perfect immovable mover doesn't have to resemble anything which Feser claims it does. By showing that his inferences to immateriality and eternality don't work, it in fact remains a possibility that there is a perfect, material, and temporal purely actual actualizer."

I appreciate that you agree that a purely actual being would also be a perfect one and I think my arguments above provide good responses to your worries.

"Feser writes: 

'Consider now that to have power is just to be able to make something happen, to actualize some potential. But then, since the cause of the existence of all things is pure actuality itself rather than merely one actual thing among others, and it is the source of all the actualizing power anything else has, it has all possible power. It is omnipotent.' 

This inference requires that the purely actual actualizer is unique, or unified, which seems to fail, at least by my lights. It need not be the single source of all actualizing power if there's more than one purely actual actualizer."

Again, I think what I wrote in response to your previous worries deals with this well.

"Another thing to point out is that Feser's definition of omnipotence may not be a good one. For one thing, while the purely actual actualizer is the source of all power present in the actual world, it need not have the direct causal power to actualize all conceivable states of affairs. It might only have the direct causal power to create a machine, which in turn has the direct causal power to actualize any state of affairs except deriving power from itself. It seems that the machine is the omnipotent thing, but according to Feser's definition, because the machine derives power from the purely actual actualizer (which only has the direct causal power to create the machine), the purely actual actualizer is the omnipotent thing."

I think I may agree that Feser's definition of omnipotence may be a bit off, but it's not too bad. I would say that omnipotence is the ability to do anything that does not presuppose or entail limitation on the part of the omnipotent being.

"Feser writes: 

'For a cause cannot give what it does not have to give. This is sometimes called the principle of proportionate causality...... When I myself have a $20 bill ready to hand and I cause you to have it, what is in the effect was in the cause formally, to use some traditional jargon. That is to say, I myself was an instance of the form or pattern of having a $20 bill, and I caused you to become another instance of that form or pattern. When I don’t have the $20 bill ready to hand but I do have at least $20 credit in my bank account, you might say that what was in the effect was in that case virtually. And when I get Congress to grant me the power to manufacture $20 bills, you might say (once again to use some traditional jargon) that I had the $20 eminently. Because in that case, I not only have the power to acquire already existing $20 bills, but the more “ eminent” power o f causing them to exist in the first place....... That is to say, to cause something to exist is just to cause something having a certain form or fitting a certain pattern. But as we have just said, the purely actual cause of things is the cause of every possible thing— every possible cat, every possible tree, every possible stone. It is for that reason the cause of every possible form or pattern a thing might have. We have also noted that whatever is in an effect must in some way or other be in its cause. Put these points together and what follows is that the forms or patterns of things must exist in the purely actual cause of things; and they must exist in it in a completely universal or abstract way, because this cause is the cause of every possible thing fitting a certain form or pattern. But to have forms or patterns in this universal or abstract way is just to have that capacity which is fundamental to intelligence.' 

It seems that Feser's inference to intelligence here is mistaken. Just because this purely actual actualizer has the power to cause something to fit a certain form or pattern, it doesn't seem to follow that these things somehow exist in the purely actual actualizer in an abstract or universal way. It only follows that this being has the active potency to produce things which fit a certain form or pattern. At most, we can infer that it has the power eminently to create these things. If Feser's inference to intelligence fails, then his inference to omniscience also seems to fail, so I won't really include a separate section for omniscience."

I'll concede that Feser's way of defending intelligence is not the best, but I'll do it my own way. I'll assume omnipotence for this. Give that omnipotence is the having of all powers that do not presuppose or entail limitation on the part of the omnipotent being, very plausibly knowledge is a power as it is a capacity and it does not seem to entail limitation on the part of the omnipotent being. Given this, the omnipotent being will also be omniscient, but since only minds can know, the omnipotent being will have a mind.

Thanks for your engagement as your posts are always very intellectually rigorous, but I hope what I say will help with your worries. I would also like to note that it seems that you are really attacking Feser rather than Aquinas in your stage two discussion so it seems a little unfair to say that you are attacking Aquinas' First Way. Nevertheless, since the master is always better than the apprentice, I'll link Aquinas' stage two (see here: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG1.C15 - start here and then go on to the rest of the Book 1 of the SCG; it's amazing). God Bless.