A Modal Contingency Argument for the Existence of God

I wrote up a modal argument for God’s existence a few months ago that I wanted to share in case anyone found it helpful or interesting. Here it is:

1. It is possible that every bounded fact or aggregate of bounded facts has an explanation (weak version of Pruss-Koons PSR).

2. The universe is the total mereological aggregate of bounded facts.

3. Since the universe is the total mereological aggregate of bounded facts, the only metaphysical entity that could explain it would be an unbounded fact or an aggregate of unbounded facts.

4. Since the universe is the total mereological aggregate of bounded facts, it possibly has an explanation in an unbounded fact or an aggregate of unbounded facts. 

5. Therefore, it is possible that there is at least one unbounded fact (from premise 4).

6. If it is possible that there is at least one unbounded fact, then there is, in fact, at least one unbounded fact.

7. Therefore, there is at least one unbounded fact (from premise 6 and S5 or B depending on the system of modal logic).

8. If there is at least one unbounded fact, then there is only one unbounded fact for an unbounded fact would be a fact which would have no bounds and so there would be nothing to distinguish it from other unbounded facts.

9. Since there is at least one unbounded fact, there is only one unbounded fact (from premise 8).

10. If there is an unbounded fact, then it must be omnipotent for if it had limited causal power then it would be a bounded fact by definition. If it did not have any causal power, then it would be an abstract entity and, therefore, could not explain any facts, but this is false from premises 3 and 4.

11. There is an unbounded fact (from premise 7) and it must be omnipotent (from premise 10).

12. If the unbounded fact is omnipotent, then it is omniscient for knowledge is a power.

13. The unbounded fact is omnipotent, therefore, the unbounded fact is omniscient (from premise 12).

14. If the unbounded fact is omniscient, then it must be a mind for only minds can have knowledge.

15. The unbounded fact is omniscient, therefore, the unbounded fact is a mind (from premise 14).

16. If the unbounded fact is wholly unbounded, which it is by definition, then it must be absolutely simple for if it were wholly unbounded then there would be nothing to distinguish parts within the fact itself. 

17. Since the unbounded fact is wholly unbounded, by definition, the unbounded fact is absolutely simple (from premise 16).

18. If the unbounded fact is absolutely simple, then it is its act of existence (this is the definition of what it is to be absolutely simple).

19. Since the unbounded fact is absolutely simple, the unbounded fact is its act of existence (from premise 18).

20. If the unbounded fact is its act of existence, then it is pure being.

21. Since the unbounded fact is its act of existence, the unbounded fact is pure being (from premise 20).

22. If the unbounded fact is pure being, then it is identical to the transcendentals in their unbounded forms for the transcendentals are simply ways of looking at being through different lenses. 

23. The unbounded fact is pure being, therefore, the unbounded fact is identical to the transcendentals in their unbounded forms (from premise 22).

24. There is only one unbounded fact (from premise 9) which is omnipotent (from premise 11), omniscient (from premise 13), a mind (from premise 15), absolutely simple (from premise 17), identical to its act of existence (from premise 19), pure being (from premise 21), and identical to the transcendentals in their unbounded forms (from premise 23).

25. If there is only one unbounded fact (from premise 9) which is omnipotent (from premise 11), omniscient (from premise 13), a mind (from premise 15), absolutely simple (from premise 17), identical to its act of existence (from premise 19), pure being (from premise 21), and identical to the transcendentals in their unbounded forms (from premise 23), then God exists.

26. There is only one unbounded fact (from premise 9) which is omnipotent (from premise 11), omniscient (from premise 13), a mind (from premise 15), absolutely simple (from premise 17), identical to its act of existence (from premise 19), pure being (from premise 21), and identical to the transcendentals in their unbounded forms (from premise 23), so God exists.

I would like to make a quick note about premise 1 as some will argue that there is a symmetry between premise 1 and its negation. It does not seem that this is the case and I’ll borrow an argument from Weaver and Rasmussen on this point: “Consider that positive conceivability of an

absence of a causally potent being is only possible if we can successfully and coherently imagine a situation in which there is an absence of any and all causally potent beings. Perhaps we can imagine an empty space in which all actual contingent things are subtracted. But what if there could be a necessarily existent, non-spatial thing? Are we able to imagine or conceptually represent its absence? Can we imagine or conceptually represent the absence of the number 9? Answers are far from obvious. Furthermore, it is far from obvious that we can imagine or conceptually represent the absence of a necessary entity that can cause something to exist. Such imagining is modally complex in a way that parallels the modal complexity of Necessary Foundation itself. It seems to us, therefore, that Chalmers’ conceivability test do not justify (1). Or, to be a bit more modest, we suggest that the conceivability test provides no more justification for the possibility of no Necessary Foundation than for the possibility of Necessary Foundation, and that, therefore, the conceivability test doesn’t directly favor one possibility over the other. Meanwhile, the conceivability-based support for the causal principle remains undefeated (not to mention the other lines of support)” (see here: https://www.academia.edu/20392976/Why_is_There_Anything). 

I would also like to make a note of premise 12, as I think it will be one of the more controversial premises in the argument. When I say power I just mean capacity and it seems that knowledge is a capacity. Now, one may object that omnipotence only entails that the omnipotent being will only have all capacities that do not entail or presuppose limitation on the part of the omnipotent being and this may preclude knowledge. I accept this definition of omnipotence and it seems to me that knowledge does not entail or presupposes limitation. If anything, it seems to remove limitation as knowledge can enable the being with knowledge to do things it could not have done otherwise: I have more capacities than a rock because, at least in part, I can know things and the rock can’t.