Some Thoughts on Intrinsic Teleology

I recently re-watched an interesting debate on the morality of homosexual acts on the phenomenal philosophy channel Majesty of Reason (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPen831EkYg&t=1971s). There were good points that were brought up on both sides of the discussion and I would not like to discuss whether homosexual acts are immoral or not, but I would rather like to address two points brought up by Dustin Crummett on intrinsic teleology. In the discussion, Crummett objected that: 1. intrinsic teleology doesn’t exist and 2. that most contemporary philosophers don’t believe that intrinsic teleology exists.


I would like to address the second point first. After I watched the debate for the first time, several months ago, I emailed Rob Koons to see if intrinsic teleology was as unpopular among contemporary philosophers as Crummett made it seem. Here is the email exchange I shared with Koons: 


Dear Dr. Koons,

 

I hope you are doing well. 

 

I recently watched a discussion on natural law, specifically in relation to the morality of homosexual activity. In that discussion, the opponent of natural law theory objected to the existence of teleology in nature and said that most contemporary philosophers share this opinion. This was quite surprising to me as I know that Aristotelianism is growing in popularity among contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of nature, and I know that some Aristotelian concepts, like powers ontology, which seems to, at least, tend towards the existence of teleology since causal powers are causal powers for certain ends, are very popular and may even be the majority position in contemporary metaphysicians. 

 

I wanted to reach out to see what you think the popularity of teleology among contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of nature really is.

 


I suspect that the speaker was trained in philosophy in the 60's or 70's. You're quite right--things are definitely moving in the teleological direction. Still, it's probably still a minority viewpoint, although approaching a majority among people working in the metaphysics of science, action theory, and ethics,

 

Rob

 

Robert C. Koons

 

So while Crummett may be technically correct that, in all likelihood, most contemporary philosophers don’t believe in intrinsic teleology, he’s wrong that it is as unpopular as he made it seem in the discussion as the general trend in contemporary metaphysics is towards an acceptance of intrinsic teleology and the acceptance of intrinsic teleology is “approaching a majority in the metaphysics of science, action theory, and ethics.”

 

Now I’ll address Crummett’s first point by providing some reason for believing in intrinsic teleology. What is surely true, as Crummett admits in the video, is that powers ontology is quite popular among contemporary metaphysicians. However, it seems that powers ontology, in order to account for regularities, requires teleology. This is because whenever a casual power is exercised and brings about a certain effect, the causal power stays the same. So why doesn’t, say, the causal power of my hand ever bring about the effect of a black hole? Simply because that is not the end of the causal power of my hand. There is something intrinsic to my hand that prevents it from creating a black hole when I move it, but enables me to throw a ball if I wish; indeed, there is an intrinsic end that my hand tends towards which accounts for this regularity. To think of another example, an acorn always grows into a tree and not an elephant because the acorn has the intrinsic end of being a tree, not the intrinsic end of being an elephant. This provides some reason for thinking that intrinsic teleology exists, at least for powers theorists.

 

So, contrary to what Crummett says, intrinsics teleology is rather popular among contemporary metaphysicians and its only increasing in popularity and there is good reason to think that intrinsics teleology exists, as long as powers ontology is true.

Comments

  1. Dominik KowalskiNovember 16, 2021 at 9:29 AM

    I was thinking that perhaps a Humean constant conjunction could also do the work required, however 1) this is dependent upon observation, so we could never actually exclude the possibility of you creating a black hole in your hand. 2) this problem only gets bigger in modality where there's no boundaries set when no direction of ones nature is given. Imagine the absurd scenarios this supposition would create in distant possible worlds.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The Engaged ThomistNovember 16, 2021 at 2:01 PM

      That's a very good point and I love the point about modality too :)

      Delete
  2. JacobDecember 8, 2021 at 11:19 PM

    "This is because whenever a casual power is exercised and brings about a certain effect, the causal power stays the same. So why doesn’t, say, the causal power of my hand ever bring about the effect of a black hole? Simply because that is not the end of the causal power of my hand."

    I'm not sure that the power's end is the answer to the question, or if it is then it is enthymemic. The causal powers or active capacities of my hand could not bring about the existence of a black hole, not simply because it is not its end to do so (the hand is also a tougher case because it is considered to have a general rather than specific end), but it is rather because the active capacities of my hand are necessarily tied to the conditions of my whole being as a material substance, and the limiting material conditions of my being transfer to the limiting of my causal powers to such conditions, which extend to my hand.

    In short, it may be the case that my hand cannot create a black hole *and* that does not fall within the purview of my hand's end, but the *reason* is not because it doesn't fall within the purview of my hand's end. Rather, the fact that it does not fall within the purview of my hand's end is due to something more fundamental, wherefrom the end of my hand is simply a byproduct. I think the explanation is deeper.

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    Replies
    1. The Engaged ThomistDecember 9, 2021 at 6:31 AM

      Thanks for the comment. It seems to me that I can agree with a lot of what you say without changing what I originally wrote. The point of this post was to bring light to the fact that if one accepts a power ontology, then they must accept teleology as well. What I was trying to argue is that if one holds to powers ontology then in order to account for regularity in the causal order, one needs to posit teleology because on powers ontology when causal powers are exercised, they do not change which is fundamentally indeterministic. Now, I agree that the teleology of the thing is grounded in the being of the thing, but this is not in conflict with what I was arguing as all I was trying to say is that teleology is a necessary component of the explanation of regularity if one holds to powers ontology. In the quote you give, all I'm arguing is that teleology is necessary for this kind of explanation, not that it is the whole explanation. I hope that helps :)

      Delete
    2. JacobDecember 9, 2021 at 12:46 PM

      Fair enough, but I suppose I'm saying that by itself it can't stand on its own and is open to several objections which would require the deeper explanation, but of course there's no law which says that blog posts have to cover everything about everything haha

      Delete
    3. The Engaged ThomistDecember 9, 2021 at 2:31 PM

      No, I agree that it can't stand on its own, but, like you said, I can't cover everything in a small blog post. God Bless :)

      Delete

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