Does the Causal Closure Argument Close off Dualism?
In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, the causal closure argument is the main argument for physicalism. Indeed, it is considered so powerful that there are few other arguments for physicalism employed by physicalists. Is it decisive, though? In this essay, I will argue that it is not. I’ll begin by explicating the causal closure argument and how it is supposed to refute dualism. I’ll then present and motivate hylomorphism by comparing it to the contemporary notion of grounding and then arguing tha t hylomorphism is still more metaphysically precise than grounding. I’ll then argue that it enables the dualist to evade the conclusion of the argument, while maintaining the causal closure of the physical and also briefly engage with epiphenomenalist worries. I’ll present an alternative dualist response and then argue that the hylomorphism response is superior. My central thesis is that hylomorphism, particularly the notion of formal causation, provides the dualist with a pl